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The aim of this work is to propose a logical framework for the speciﬁcation of cognitive
emotions that are based on counterfactual reasoning about agents’ choices. The prototypical
counterfactual emotion is regret. In order to meet this objective, we exploit the well-known
STIT logic (Belnap et al. (2001) [9], Horty (2001) [30], Horty and Belnap (1995) [31]). STIT
logic has been proposed in the domain of formal philosophy in the nineties and, more
recently, it has been imported into the ﬁeld of theoretical computer science where its
formal relationships with other logics for multi-agent systems such as ATL and Coalition
Logic (CL) have been studied. STIT is a very suitable formalism to reason about choices and
capabilities of agents and groups of agents. Unfortunately, the version of STIT with agents
and groups has been recently proved to be undecidable and not ﬁnitely axiomatizable. In
this work we study a decidable and ﬁnitely axiomatizable fragment of STIT with agents
and groups which is suﬃciently expressive for our purpose of formalizing counterfactual
emotions. We call dfSTIT our STIT fragment. After having extended dfSTIT with knowledge
modalities, in the second part of article, we exploit it in order to formalize four types
of counterfactual emotions: regret, rejoicing, disappointment, and elation. At the end of
the article we present an application of our formalization of counterfactual emotions to a
concrete example.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
A major objective of AI is to develop interactive cognitive systems which are more attractive and closer to the users and
that can be considered as believable interlocutors [8]. In this perspective, a challenge for AI is to build artiﬁcial agents which
are capable of: reasoning about emotions, showing their affective states and personalities, ascribing emotions to humans,
predicting the effects of their actions on emotions of humans, and adapting their behaviors accordingly. With the aim of
creating a new generation of emotional interaction systems, the study of affective phenomena has become a “hot” topic in
AI where the domain of Affective Computing [44] has emerged in the last few years.
Recently, some researchers have been interested in developing logical frameworks for the formal analysis of emotions
(see, e.g., [39,40,58,20]). Their main concern is to exploit logical methods in order to provide a rigorous speciﬁcation of
how emotions should be implemented in an artiﬁcial agent. The design of agent-based systems where agents are capable of
reasoning about and of displaying some kind of emotions can indeed beneﬁt from the accuracy of logical methods. These
logical frameworks for the speciﬁcation of emotions are based on the so-called BDI logics (see e.g. [17,41]). BDI logics allow
to model agents’ mental states such as beliefs, desires, intentions, ideals, values, etc., which are the cognitive constituents
of emotions.
✩ This work is an extended and improved version of the article “A logic for reasoning about counterfactual emotions” appeared in the Proceedings of the
Twenty-ﬁrst International Joint Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence (IJCAI’09), pp. 867–872.
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still much work to be done in the ﬁeld of computational and logical modeling of ‘counterfactual emotions’. In line with
psychological theories of ‘counterfactual emotions’, we use this term to denote those emotions such as regret which arise
during ‘counterfactual thinking’, that is, when “[. . . ] reality is compared to an imagined view of what might have been” [33,
p. 136]. In other terms, counterfactual emotions are based on an agent’s alteration of a factual situation and in the agent’s
imagination of an alternative situation that could have realized if something different was done [49].
The aim of our work is to advance the state of the art on computational modeling of affective phenomena by providing
a logic which supports reasoning about this kind of emotions. Our major concern here is to ﬁnd a fair trade off between
expressivity and complexity of the formalism. We want a logic which is suﬃciently expressive to capture the fundamental
constituents of counterfactual emotions and, at the same time, with good mathematical properties in terms of decidability
and complexity. To this aim, we exploit a well-known logic called STIT [9,30]. STIT logic has been proposed in the domain
of formal philosophy in the nineties and, more recently, it has been imported into the ﬁeld of theoretical computer science
where its formal relationships with other logics for multi-agent systems have been studied (see, e.g., [12]). It is a very
suitable formalism to reason about counterfactual choices of agents and of groups. Unfortunately, the version of STIT with
agents and groups proposed by Horty [30] has been recently proved to be undecidable and not ﬁnitely axiomatizable [29].
In this work we study a decidable and ﬁnitely axiomatizable fragment of this logic which is suﬃciently expressive for our
purpose of formalizing counterfactual emotions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce one of the most inﬂuential research approach to emotions:
appraisal theory. We provide a general overview of existing models of emotions proposed in this area by devoting spe-
cial attention to appraisal models of counterfactual emotions. We discuss how counterfactual emotions such as regret and
disappointment are deﬁned in these models.
Section 3 is the ﬁrst step in developing a representation language for the formalization of counterfactual emotions. We
introduce a fragment of the version of STIT logic with agents and groups proposed by Horty [30]. We call dfSTIT our STIT
fragment. Differently from Horty’s logic, we prove that our fragment is decidable and ﬁnitely axiomatizable.
In Section 4, we exploit the STIT fragment dfSTIT in order to formalize counterfactual statements of the form “group J
(or agent i) could have prevented χ to be true”. These statements are indeed basic constituents of counterfactual emotions
and will be fundamental for the formalization of counterfactual emotions given in Section 6.
In Section 5, we extend the STIT fragment dfSTIT studied in Section 3 with knowledge operators. This is a necessary
step in order to capture the subjective dimension of the affective phenomena we intend to analyze in our work. We provide
decidability results and a complete axiomatization for our epistemic extension of dfSTIT. We decided to present ﬁrst the
STIT fragment without knowledge and then the extension with knowledge operators rather than to present a direct version
of a STIT fragment with knowledge operators for several reasons. The ﬁrst one is because the STIT fragment without
knowledge studied in Section 3 is interesting in itself since it already allows to express counterfactual statements which are
an interesting component of counterfactual emotions. The second one is because the proof of decidability and the proof of
completeness of the STIT fragment with knowledge become much simpler after having studied the STIT fragment without
knowledge.
In Section 6, the logical framework of Section 5, is ﬁnally applied to the formalization of counterfactual emotions. We
provide a formalization of four types of counterfactual emotions: regret and its positive counterpart rejoicing, disappointment
and its positive counterpart elation. The formal deﬁnitions of these four emotions will be based on the psychological models
of counterfactual emotions discussed in Section 2. Section 7 presents an application of our logical formalization of counter-
factual emotions to a concrete example. Before concluding we discuss in Section 8 some related works in the area of logical
modeling of emotions and affective agents.
Proofs of the main theorems are collected in the annex at the end of the article.
2. Emotion theories
Our general objective in this work is to provide a formal model of emotions which can be used as an abstract speci-
ﬁcation for the design of artiﬁcial agents interacting with humans. To ensure the accuracy of a such a formal model, it is
important to consider how emotions have been deﬁned in the psychological literature. Indeed, in order to build artiﬁcial
agents with the capability of recognizing the emotions of a human user, of anticipating the emotional effects of their actions
on the human, of affecting the user’s emotions by the performance of actions directed to his emotions (e.g. actions aimed
at reducing the human’s stress due to his negative emotions, actions aimed at inducing positive emotions in the human),
we must endow such agents with an adequate model of human emotions.
There exist several theoretical approaches to emotions in psychology. We here consider one of the most inﬂuential called
appraisal theory (see [53] for a broad introduction to the developments in appraisal theory).
In Section 2.1, we provide a general introduction to appraisal theory by reviewing some of the most popular models
proposed in this area. Then, in Section 2.2, we will focus on appraisal models of counterfactual emotions and of regret
in particular. This section will provide the conceptual basis for the formalization of counterfactual emotions proposed in
Section 6.
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Appraisal theory has emphasized the strong relationship between emotion and cognition, by stating that each emotion
can be related to speciﬁc patterns of evaluations and interpretations of events, situations or objects (appraisal patterns)
based on a number of dimensions or criteria called appraisal variables (e.g. goal relevance, desirability, likelihood, causal
attribution). Appraisal variables are directly related to the mental attitudes of the individual (e.g. beliefs, predictions, desires,
goals, intentions). For instance, when prospecting the possibility of winning a lottery and considering ‘I win the lottery’ as
a desirable event, an agent might feel an intense hope. When prospecting the possibility of catching the H1N1 ﬂu and
considering ‘I catch the H1N1 ﬂu’ as an undesirable event, an agent might feel an intense fear.
It is worth noting that most appraisal models of emotions assume that explicit evaluations based on evaluative beliefs
(i.e. the belief that a certain event is good or bad, pleasant or unpleasant, dangerous or frustrating) are a necessary con-
stituent of emotional experience. On the other hand, there are some appraisal models mostly promoted by philosophers
[55,26] in which emotions are reduced to speciﬁc combinations of beliefs and desires, and in which the link between cog-
nition and emotion is not necessarily mediated by evaluative beliefs. Reisenzein [47] calls cognitive-evaluative the former
and cognitive-motivational the latter kind of models. For example, according to cognitive-motivational models of emotions,
a person’s happiness about a certain fact χ can be reduced to the person’s belief that χ obtains and the person’s desire
that χ obtains. On the contrary, according to cognitive-evaluative models, a person feels happy about a certain fact χ if she
believes that χ obtains and she evaluates χ to be good (desirable) for her. In the present work, we stay closer to cognitive-
evaluative models. In fact, we suppose that an agent’s positive (resp. negative) emotion requires the agent’s (evaluative)
belief that a certain event, situation or object is good (resp. bad) for her. For example, according to the formalization of
rejoicing we will propose in Section 6, if an agent rejoices for a certain event χ then he believes that χ is something good
for him.
Now let us provide a more comprehensive overview of the research in appraisal theory by brieﬂy discussing some of the
most important models of emotions in this area.
Lazarus’s model. Lazarus [56,36] distinguishes primary appraisal from secondary appraisal. These two kinds of appraisal are
not sequential: they can be executed in any order. During primary appraisal a person assesses the relevance and congruence
of an event with respect to her desires and goals, that is, she evaluates whether an event helps or threatens the achievement
of her goals and/or the satisfaction of her desires. During secondary appraisal, the person evaluates available capabilities and
resources to cope with a certain event. For instance, after feeling an intense fear because of the belief that the undesirable
event ‘I catch the H1N1 ﬂu’ will probably occur, an agent might consider whether to get vaccinated against the H1N1 ﬂu in
order to reduce his risks.1
Scherer’s model. In Scherer’s model [52], the appraisal process is conceived as a sequence of processing levels of a given
stimulus (Stimulus Evaluation Checks) which underlies the assessment of the signiﬁcance of the stimulus for an individual.
In particular, according to Scherer’s model, an event is sequentially evaluated through the following four steps: relevance
detection (i.e. whether the event is novel and important with respect to the momentary goals of the individual), implication
assessment (i.e. whether the event will further or endanger the individual’s attainment of his goals), coping potential determi-
nation (i.e. whether the individual can cope with the expected consequences of the event), normative signiﬁcance evaluation
(i.e. whether the event is signiﬁcant with respect to the individual’s ideals and values). Contrarily to Lazarus’s model, in
Scherer’s model the different stages of the appraisal process are sequential.
Roseman’smodel. Roseman’s appraisal model [50,51] distinguishes seven appraisal dimensions that were found to differenti-
ate a large number of emotions: unexpectedness, situational state, motivational state, probability, control potential, problem
source and agency. In Roseman’s model, unexpectedness refers to whether an event is expected or unexpected by a person,
and situational state refers to whether the event is wanted or unwanted by the person. Motivational state refers to whether
the person assesses that the event has positive or negative implications on her goals, and probability refers to whether the
person thinks that the occurrence of the event is merely possible/probable or is deﬁnite. Control potential refers to whether
the person thinks she can cope with the event, and problem source refers to whether the event is unwanted by the per-
son because she thinks that it blocks attainment of her goals or because of some inherent characteristic. Finally, agency
refers to the person’s evaluation of the cause of the event (i.e. whether it was caused by the self, by someone else, or by
circumstances beyond anyone’s control).
OCC model. According to Ortony, Clore and Collins’s model (OCC model) [42], emotion arises from valenced (a dimension
ranging from positive to negative) reactions to consequences of events, actions of agents, or aspects of objects. In the
OCC model, the consequence of an event can be appraised as pleased or displeased. A person can be focused either on the
1 Lazarus also distinguishes appraisal from coping. Coping is the process of dealing with emotion, either externally by forming an intention to act in the
world or internally by changing the agent’s interpretation of the situation (e.g. by changing beliefs, shifting attention, shifting responsibility). Indeed, to
discharge a certain emotion, an agent has to modify those mental attitudes that sustain her emotional state.
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on the self, she will feel hope when the consequences of the event are desirable for her, and she will feel fear when the
consequences of the event are undesirable for her. In the OCC model the action of an agent can be approved or disapproved.
A person can be focused either on her actions or on the actions of another agent. For example, if the person is focused
on another agent’s action, she will fell admiration when she approves this action, and she will feel reproach when she
disapproves it. Finally, the aspects of an object can be liked or disliked. If a person likes the aspects of an object she will feel
love. She will feel hate if she dislikes them.
Frijda’s model. In Frijda’s model [22] appraisal is deﬁned as a sequence of evaluation steps determining the characteristics
of a given stimulus: causes and consequences of the event, relevance and congruence with respect to current goals and in-
terests, coping possibilities, and urgency. However, this model considers not only the appraisal patterns of different emotion
types, but also the action tendencies induced by emotions. According to Frijda, actions tendencies are [22, p. 75] “. . . states
of readiness to achieve or maintain a given kind of relationship with the environment. They can be conceived of as plans or
programs to achieve such ends, which are put in a state of readiness.” For example, the action tendency associated to fear
is escape. After a stimulus has been evaluated according to the previous appraisal dimensions, an action tendency is then
created that induces physiological changes, and ﬁnally an action is selected and executed.2
2.2. Appraisal models of counterfactual emotions
Regret is the prototypical counterfactual emotion which has been widely investigated in psychology and in the ﬁeld of
decision theory in economics. Most authors (see, e.g., [37,59,48,33,32,71]) agree in considering regret as “. . . a negative,
cognitively determined emotion that we experience when realizing or imagining that our present situation would have
been better, had we acted differently” [71, p. 255]. In other words, regret stems from the comparison between the actual
outcome deriving from a given choice and a counterfactual better outcome that might have been had one chosen a different
action. Such a deﬁnition highlights the strong connection between decision-making and regret: broadly speaking, regret can
be conceived as an emotion originating from a person’s perception of her ‘bad decision’. From this perspective, a sense
responsibility for a bad outcome has been often considered a speciﬁc characteristic of the phenomenology of regret, that is,
the more a decision maker perceives himself to be responsible for a negative outcome, the more regret he experiences [23].3
This aspect clearly distinguishes regret from disappointment. According to some economists [38] and to some psycholo-
gists [19,70], disappointment too is part of the family of counterfactual emotions. But, although regret and disappointment
both originate from the comparison between the actual outcome and a counterfactual outcome that might have occurred,
disappointment follows from the comparison between the actual outcome and a counterfactual better outcome that might
have been had a different state of the world occurred. That is, while regret is related to a sense of responsibility and in-
volves an internal attribution of the cause of a bad outcome (i.e. when feeling regret a person considers her own choices to
be the cause of a bad outcome), disappointment is related to external attribution (i.e. when feeling disappointed a person
considers external events to be the cause of a bad outcome).
The positive counterparts of regret and disappointment have also been considered in the psychological literature (see,
e.g., [68,69]). The former is called rejoicing, while the latter is called elation. Broadly speaking, one can say that while
rejoicing stems from the comparison between the actual outcome deriving from a given choice and a counterfactual worst
outcome that might have been had one chosen a different action, elation follows from the comparison between the actual
outcome and a counterfactual worst outcome that might have been had a different state of the world occurred.
The next Section 3 is our ﬁrst step in the development of a formal representation language for modeling counterfactual
emotions. We study a decidable fragment of STIT logic with groups of agents proposed by Horty [30], and we give an
axiomatization of it. STIT is indeed a suitable framework for expressing counterfactual statements about actions and choices
of the form “group J (or agent i) could have prevented a certain state of affairs χ to be true now”. Such statements are
fundamental building blocks for an analysis of counterfactual emotions.
3. A decidable and ﬁnitely axiomatizable fragment of STIT
The logic STIT (“Seeing to it that”) is a modal logic framework dealing with what agents and groups of agents do and can
do. More precisely, STIT supports reasoning about the effects of actions of agents and groups, and about the capabilities of
agents and groups to ensure certain outcomes. In [9], the language of STIT with individuals but without groups is studied:
Belnap et al. introduce constructions of the form [i stit : ϕ] to be read “agent i sees to it that ϕ” or “agent i brings it about
that ϕ”. They give a complete axiomatization of STIT without groups and prove that the logic is decidable. The extension of
2 According to Lazarus [36], there is an important difference between action tendencies and coping strategies. While the former are innately programmed
unconscious reﬂexes and routines, the latter are the product of a conscious deliberation process.
3 Compared to the large number of authors relating regret with responsibility for a bad outcome, there are very few authors who separate the two
concepts. According to [60,57] for instance, one can be regretful also for events that are partially or totally beyond one’s own control or for choices for
which there was no alternative. However, we here adopt the deﬁnition of regret shared by the majority of authors emphasizing the link between regret
and responsibility.
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J sees to it that ϕ”. For notational convenience, we write here [ J ]ϕ instead of [ J stit : ϕ]. Unfortunately, in [29] Horty’s
STIT logic has been proved to be undecidable and unaxiomatizable (with a ﬁnite number of axioms schemas, necessitation
rules and modus ponens).
We here introduce a decidable and axiomatizable fragment of STIT with agents and groups called dfSTIT which is
suﬃciently expressive to formalize counterfactual emotions. First, in Section 3.1, we recall the syntax of STIT and deﬁne the
syntactic fragment dfSTIT. In Section 3.2, we recall deﬁnition of models of the logic STIT. Then, in Section 3.3, we recall
the logic NCL (Normal Coalition Logic) [5,61,54]. The logic NCL shares the same syntax with STIT and its semantics looks
like the semantics of STIT. Nevertheless, NCL is axiomatizable. The logic NCL will be a key point to prove the decidability
of the STIT fragment dfSTIT and to give a complete axiomatization of dfSTIT (Section 3.4).
3.1. Syntax
Let n be a strictly positive integer. Let ATM be a countable set of atomic propositions and let AGT = {1, . . . ,n} be a
ﬁnite set of agents. The language LSTIT of the logic STIT with agents and groups proposed by Horty [30] is deﬁned by the
following BNF:
ϕ ::= p | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ¬ϕ | [ J ]ϕ
where p ranges over ATM and J over 2AGT . 〈 J 〉ϕ is an abbreviation of ¬[ J ]¬ϕ . Operators of type [ J ] are used to describe
the effects of the action that has been chosen by J . If J is a singleton we refer to J as an agent, whereas if J has more
than one element we refer to J as a group. In Belnap et al.’s STIT, an agent i’s action is described in terms of the result
that agent i brings about by his acting. For example, i’s action of killing another agent j is described by the fact that i sees
to it that j is dead. In Horty’s STIT with agents and groups we can make a distinction between individual actions of agents
and joint actions of groups. The joint action of a group J is described in terms of the result that the agents in J bring about
by acting together.
If J has more than one element the construction [ J ]ϕ means “group J sees to it that ϕ no matter what the other
agents in AGT \ J do”. If J is a singleton {i} the construction [{i}]ϕ means “agent i sees to it that ϕ no matter what
the other agents in AGT \ {i} do”. For notational convenience, we write [i] instead of [{i}]. [∅]ϕ can be shorten to “ϕ is
necessarily true”. The operator [∅] is exactly the historic necessity operator already present in the individual STIT logic [9].
The dual expression 〈∅〉ϕ means “ϕ is possibly true”. Note that the operators 〈∅〉 and [ J ] can be combined in order to
express what agents and groups can do: 〈∅〉[ J ]ϕ means “ J can see to it that ϕ no matter what the other agents in AGT \ J
do”.
Here we are interested in a fragment of LSTIT we call LdfSTIT . It is deﬁned by the following BNF:
χ ::= ⊥ | p | χ ∧ χ | ¬χ (propositional formulas)
ψ ::= [ J ]χ | ψ ∧ ψ (see-to-it formulas)
ϕ ::= χ | ψ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ¬ϕ | 〈∅〉ψ (see-to-it and “can” formulas)
where p ranges over ATM and J over 2AGT \ {∅}.
LdfSTIT is a syntactic restriction of LSTIT . We have LdfSTIT ⊆ LSTIT but LSTIT  LdfSTIT . For instance, [1][{1,2}]p is in
LSTIT but is not in LdfSTIT .
3.2. Models
We give two semantics of STIT. It is proved in [29] that these two semantics are equivalent. The ﬁrst one corresponds to
the original semantics of STIT with agents and groups proposed by Horty [30]. The other one is based on the product logic
S5n [24] and will be used in Section 3.4 in order to characterize the satisﬁability of a dfSTIT-formula. Let us ﬁrst recall the
original semantics of STIT.
Deﬁnition 1 (STIT-model). A STIT-model is a tuple M = (W , {R J } J⊆AGT , V ) where:
• W is a non-empty set of possible worlds or states;
• For all J ⊆ AGT , R J is an equivalence relation over W such that:
1. R J ⊆ R∅;
2. R J =⋂ j∈ J R{ j};
3. for all w ∈ W , for all (w j) j∈AGT ∈ R∅(w)n , ⋂ j∈AGT R{ j}(w j) 
= ∅;
4. RAGT = idW .
• V is a valuation function, that is, V : W → 2ATM .
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J ∈ 2AGT , we deﬁne R J (w) = {v ∈ W | wR J v}.
R J (w) is the set of outcomes that is forced by group J ’s action at world w , that is, at world w group J forces the world
to be in some state of R J (w). Hence, if v ∈ R J (w) then v is an outcome that is admitted by group J ’s action at world w .
Note that if v is admitted by group J ’s action at world w (i.e. v ∈ R J (w)) then this means that, given what the agents
in J have chosen at w , there exists a joint action of the agents in AGT \ J such that, if the agents in AGT \ J did choose this
joint action, v would be the actual outcome of the joint action of all agents.
We recall that R∅ is the relation over all possible outcomes: if w is the current world and wR∅v then v is a possible
outcome at w . Thus, Constraint 1 on STIT models just means that the set of outcomes that is forced by J ’s action is a subset
of the set of possible outcomes. Constraint 2 just says that the set of outcomes that is forced by J ’s joint action at a world
w is equal to the pointwise intersection of the sets of outcomes that are forced by the individual actions of the agents in J
at w . Constraint 3 expresses a so-called assumption of independence of agents: if w1, . . . ,wn are possible outcomes at w then
the intersection of the set of outcomes that is forced by agent 1’s action at w1, and the set of outcomes that is forced by
agent 2’s action at w2, . . . , and the set of outcomes that is forced by agent n’s action at wn is not empty. More intuitively,
this means that agents can never be deprived of choices due to the choices made by other agents. Constraint 4 expresses
an assumption of determinism: the set of outcomes that is forced by the joint action of all agents is a singleton that is to
say we have RAGT(w) = {w} for all w ∈ W .
Truth conditions for atomic formulas and the boolean operators are entirely standard. For every J ∈ 2AGT , the truth
conditions of the modal operators [ J ] are classically deﬁned by:
M,w | [ J ]ϕ iff M, v | ϕ for all v ∈ W such that wR J v.
The alternative semantics of STIT is based on the product logic S5n . It is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 2 (product STIT-model). A product STIT-model is a tuple M = (W , V ) where:
• W = W1 × · · · × Wn where Wi are non-empty sets of worlds or states;
• V is a valuation function, that is, V : W → 2ATM .
Truth conditions for atomic formulas and the boolean operators are also entirely standard. The truth conditions for the
modal operators [ J ] in product STIT-models are:
M, (w1, . . . ,wn) | [ J ]ϕ iff M, (v1, . . . , vn) | ϕ for all (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ W such that v j = w j if j ∈ J .
Now let us just recall the notion of validity and satisﬁability in STIT. As there is an equivalence between a STIT-model
and a product STIT-model as proved by [29], we can deﬁne those notions either with respect to STIT-models or with
respect to product STIT-models. A formula ϕ is STIT-valid (noted |STIT ϕ) if and only if ϕ is true in every world of every
STIT-model. Or, equivalently, a formula ϕ is STIT-valid if and only if ϕ is true in every world of every product STIT-
model. A formula ϕ is STIT-satisﬁable if and only if there exists a STIT-model M = (W , {R J } J⊆AGT , V ) and a point w ∈ W
such that M, w | ϕ . Or, equivalently, a formula ϕ is STIT-satisﬁable if and only if there exists a product STIT-model
M = (W , V ) and a point (w1, . . . ,wn) ∈ W such that M, (w1, . . . ,wn) | ϕ .
3.3. The NCL logic
Unfortunately, STIT with agents and groups is not axiomatizable. Nevertheless, there exists an axiomatizable logic which
is very close to STIT. This logic is the fragment of Normal Coalition Logic (NCL) [5,61,54,13] in which we do not deal with
the next operator. Normal Coalition Logic was originally proposed in order to embed non-normal Coalition Logic CL [43]
into a normal modal logic. This embedding uses a general technique developed by [25]. The reader can ﬁnd more details
about this speciﬁc embedding in [5,61,13]. As CL, NCL is axiomatizable and decidable.
Below we show that the fragment of Normal Coalition Logic without time axiomatizes the set of validities in the fragment
LdfSTIT of STIT. Moreover, we prove our central characterization theorem of a STIT-satisﬁable formula of the fragment
LdfSTIT by using the Normal Coalition Logic without time. In rest of the paper, when we write NCL we refer to the fragment
of Normal Coalition Logic with the operators of group action [ J ] and without the next operator.
3.3.1. Deﬁnition
We start by giving the deﬁnition of the logic NCL. Concerning the syntax, as here we do not deal with the next operator,
the language of NCL-formulas is the same as the language of STIT-formulas, that is to say, LNCL = LSTIT . Concerning the
semantics, here is the deﬁnition of a NCL-model:
Deﬁnition 3 (NCL-model). A NCL-model is a tuple M = (W , R, V ) where:
• W is a non-empty set of worlds or states;
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1. R J1∪ J2 ⊆ R J1 ∩ R J2 ;
2. R∅ ⊆ R J ◦ RAGT\ J ;
3. RAGT = IdW .
• V : W → 2ATM is a valuation function.
As in Deﬁnition 1, R J (w) represents the set of outcomes that is forced by group J ’s action at world w , and if v ∈ R J (w)
then v is an outcome that is admitted by group J ’s action at world w . Hence, Constraint 1 says that if v is admitted by
group J1 ∪ J2’s action at w , then v is admitted by group J1’s action and by group J2’s action at w . Constraint 2 is close
to the assumption of independence of agents of STIT logic. According to Constraint 2, if v is a possible outcome at w then,
there exists a world u such that u is admitted by group J ’s action at w and v is admitted by group AGT \ J ’s action at u.
Constraint 3 expresses an assumption of determinism for the set of all agents AGT .
As usual truth conditions for atomic formulas and the boolean operators are entirely standard and the truth conditions
of the operators [ J ] are given in a traditional way by:
M,w | [ J ]ϕ iff M, v | ϕ for all v ∈ W such that wR J v.
In the same way, we introduce notions of validity and satisﬁability in NCL. A formula ϕ is NCL-valid (noted |NCL ϕ)
if and only if ϕ is true in every world of every NCL-model. A formula ϕ is NCL-satisﬁable if and only if there exists a
NCL-model M = (W , R, V ) and a point w ∈ W such that M,w | ϕ .
3.3.2. Axiomatization of NCL
Constraints 1, 2, 3 presented in the Deﬁnition 3 above directly correspond to Sahlqvist axiom schemas [10]. For instance
Constraint 2 (R∅ ⊆ R J ◦ RAGT\ J ) corresponds to the axiom schema 〈∅〉ϕ → 〈 J 〉〈AGT \ J 〉ϕ . This is the reason why NCL logic
is axiomatizable unlike STIT logic. The following Theorem 1, which has been proved by [13], sums up this fact.
Theorem 1. The logic NCL is complete with respect to the following axiomatization:
(ProTau) all tautologies of propositional calculus
S5([ J ]) all S5-theorems, for every [ J ]
(Mon) [ J1]ϕ ∨ [ J2]ϕ → [ J1 ∪ J2]ϕ
Elim(∅) 〈∅〉ϕ → 〈 J 〉〈AGT \ J 〉ϕ
Triv(AGT) ϕ → [AGT]ϕ
plus modus ponens and necessitation for all [ J ].
As NCL is axiomatizable, we can introduce the symbol NCL to deal with proofs. We write NCL ϕ to say that ϕ is a
theorem of the axiomatization given in Theorem 1.
3.3.3. Link between STIT and NCL
In the case of individual STIT logic, i.e. when the STIT language only has operator [∅] and operators [i] with i ∈ AGT ,
the notion of satisﬁability in STIT and the notion of satisﬁability in NCL are equivalent [5, Theorem 14]. When we con-
sider group STIT logic with operators of group action [ J ] (with J ⊆ AGT), the two notions are different. The following
Proposition 1 highlights the relationship between satisﬁability in group STIT logic and satisﬁability in NCL.
Proposition 1. Let ϕ be a formula of LSTIT .
• If card(AGT) 2: ϕ is STIT-satisﬁable iff ϕ is NCL-satisﬁable;
• If card(AGT)  3: if ϕ is STIT-satisﬁable then ϕ is NCL-satisﬁable. (The converse is false: there exists ϕ such that ϕ is NCL-
satisﬁable and ¬ϕ is STIT-valid.)
Although the two logics NCL and STIT are different, the property of independence of agents holds in NCL. This fact is
stated in the following Lemma 1 and illustrated in Fig. 1. Every NCL-model satisﬁes the Constraint 3 (assumption of indepen-
dence of agents) of Deﬁnition 1. This property will be important in the constructive proof of Theorem 2. More precisely, it
will be used in the proof of Lemma 2 (see Appendix A at the end of the paper).
Lemma 1. Let M = (W , R, V ) be a NCL-model. Let r be a positive integer.4 Let w1, . . . ,wr ∈ W be such that for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , r},
wi R∅w j. Let J1, . . . , Jr ⊆ AGT be such that i 
= j implies J i ∩ J j = ∅. We have:
4 Note that Lemma 1, in the degenerated case r = 0, says that ⋂i=1...0 R Ji (wi) 
= ∅. This is true because the intersection of zero subsets of W is W × W
by convention.
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Fig. 2. Overview of the languages L and LdfSTIT and of the logics STIT and NCL.
⋂
i=1,...,r
R J i (wi) 
= ∅.
Our fragment dfSTIT of STIT logic with agents and groups has interesting computational properties. In the rest of this
section, we are going to show that dfSTIT can be axiomatized by the axiomatics of the logic NCL, and that dfSTIT is
decidable. To prove this, we are going to study the link between NCL and STIT when we restrict formulas to the fragment
dfSTIT. Proposition 1 given above explains that in the general case, if a formula is STIT-satisﬁable then it is NCL -satisﬁable.
The following Theorem 2 explains that the notion of satisﬁability in STIT and in NCL is the same if we restrict formulas to
the fragment dfSTIT.
Theorem 2. Let ϕ ∈ LdfSTIT . Then, the following three propositions are equivalent:
1. ϕ is NCL-satisﬁable;
2. ϕ is STIT-satisﬁable;
3. ϕ is STIT-satisﬁable in a polynomial sized product STIT-model.
Fig. 2 highlights the relation between STIT and NCL. If we consider the whole set of formulas LSTIT , then we have that
all validities of NCL are validities of STIT but not the converse. But if we restrict formulas to the fragment LdfSTIT , then the
set of validities of NCL is equal to the set of validities of STIT.
3.4. Decidability and axiomatization
The result of Theorem 2 is close to the result of Pauly in [43]. In [43], Pauly compares strategic form games (like STIT-
models) and CL standard models (like NCL-models). Theorem 2 provides two crucial results: one about complexity and
another one about axiomatization of dfSTIT.
The following corollary follows from the equivalence between point 2 and 3 in Theorem 2.
Corollary 1. Deciding if a formula in LdfSTIT is STIT-satisﬁable is NP-complete.
The following corollary follows from the equivalence between point 1 and 2 in Theorem 2.
Corollary 2. A formula ϕ in LdfSTIT is STIT-valid iff we have NCL ϕ .
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3.5. Discussion
Before concluding this section, let us explain why we decided to use dfSTIT instead of NCL for our logical analysis of
counterfactual emotions.
The ﬁrst reason is practical as the complexity of dfSTIT is lower than the complexity of NCL: the satisﬁability problem
for NCL is NEXPTIME-complete [5] while it is NP-complete for dfSTIT (Corollary 1). Moreover, as we will show in Section 5
(Theorem 3), the complexity of dfSTIT extended by epistemic modal operators is still lower than the complexity of NCL, in
particular the satisﬁability problem for the epistemic extension of dfSTIT is PSPACE-complete.
The second reason is theoretical. While STIT semantics has received several philosophical and conceptual justiﬁcations in
works by Belnap, Horty and col. (see, e.g., [9,30,31]) and is nowadays widely accepted in the ﬁelds of philosophical logic and
of logics for multi-agent systems, NCL semantics does not have such a robust conceptual and philosophical basis. Indeed,
NCL was developed mainly in order to embed CL into a decidable normal modal logic. For instance, we have shown that in
Horty’s STIT logic, the set of outcomes that is forced by the joint action of a group J is equal to the pointwise intersection
of the sets of outcomes that are forced by the individual actions of the agents in J (Constraint 2 in Deﬁnition 1). This is
a natural way to deﬁne the notion of group action which is well-justiﬁed by Horty in [30]. But such a property of group
action does not hold in the NCL semantics, and this is one the reason why the notion of group action in NCL is not as clear
as in STIT.5
It is worth noting that NCL and STIT already differs with a formula of modal depth 3. Indeed, the formula
ϕ = ¬[〈{2,3}〉p ∧ 〈{1,3}〉q ∧ 〈{1,2}〉r → 〈∅〉[〈{2,3}〉(〈{1,3}〉p ∧ 〈{2,3}〉q) ∧ 〈{1,3}〉(〈{2,3}〉r ∧ 〈{1,2}〉p) ∧ 〈{2,3}〉(〈{1,2}〉q ∧
〈{1,3}〉r)]] is NCL-satisﬁable and ¬ϕ is STIT-valid [24]. It is an open question whether NCL and STIT differs with a formula
of modal depth 2.
4. Counterfactual statements in STIT
In this section we exploit the STIT fragment dfSTIT studied in Section 3 in order to formalize counterfactual statements
of the form “group J (or agent i) could have prevented a certain state of affairs χ to be true now”. Such statements are
indeed basic constituents of the appraisal patters of counterfactual emotions such as regret. In particular, counterfactual
emotions such as regret originate from reasoning about this kind of statements highlighting the connection between the
actual state of the world and a counterfactual state of the world that might have been had one chosen a different action. The
counterfactual statements formalized in this section will be fundamental for the formalization of counterfactual emotions
we will give in Section 6.
4.1. J could have prevented χ
The following counterfactual statement is a fundamental constituent of an analysis of counterfactual emotions:
(∗) J could have prevented a certain state of affairs χ to be true now.
The statement just means that there is a counterfactual dependence between the state of affairs χ and group J (i.e. χ
counterfactually depends on J ’s choice). The STIT fragment studied in Section 3 allows to represent it in a formal language.
We write CHP Jχ this formal representation, which is deﬁned as follows:
CHP Jχ
def= χ ∧ ¬[AGT \ J ]χ.
The expression ¬[AGT \ J ]χ means that: the complement of J with respect to AGT (i.e. AGT \ J ) does not see to it that χ (no
matter what the agents in J have chosen to do). This is the same thing as saying that: given what the agents in AGT \ J have
chosen, there exists an alternative joint action of the agents in J such that, if the agents in J did choose this joint action,
χ would be false now. Thus, χ and ¬[AGT \ J ]χ together correctly translate the previous counterfactual statement (∗). If J
is a singleton {i}, we write CHPiχ instead of CHP{i}χ which means “agent i could have prevented χ to be true”.
The following is the semantic counterpart of the operator CHP J . We have that M, w | CHP Jχ if and only if, M, w | χ
and there is v ∈ RAGT\ J (w) such that M, v | ¬χ . That is, at world w of model M, J could have prevented χ to be true if
and only if, χ is true at w and, given what the agents in AGT \ J have chosen at w , there exists a joint action of the agents
in J such that, if the agents in J did choose this action, the actual outcome of the joint action of all agents would be a
state in which χ is false.
Example 1. Imagine a typical coordination scenario with two agents AGT = {1,2}. Agents 1 and 2 have to take care of a
plant. Each agent has only two actions available: water the plant (water) or do nothing (skip). If either both agents water the
5 Note that in NCL semantics we only have R J ⊆⋂ j∈ J R{ j} .
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plant or both agents do nothing, the plant will die (dead). In the former case the plant will die since it does not tolerate too
much water. In the latter case it will die since it lacks water. If one agent waters the plant and the other does nothing, the
plant will survive (¬dead). The scenario is represented in the STIT model in Fig. 3. For instance both at world w2 and w4,
formulas CHP1 dead and CHP2 dead are true: each agent could have prevented the plant to be dead. Indeed, at world w2,
dead and ¬[2]dead are true: given what agent 2 has chosen (i.e. water), there exists an alternative action of agent 1 (i.e.
skip) such that, if 1 did choose this action, dead would be false now. At world w4, dead and ¬[2]dead are also true: given
what agent 2 has chosen (i.e. skip), there exists an alternative action of agent 1 (i.e. water) such that, if 1 did choose this
action, dead would be false now. The case for agent 2 is completely symmetrical.
The following are some interesting properties of the operator CHP J . For every J and for every J1, J2 such that J1 ⊆ J2:
|STIT CHP J1(χ1 ∨ χ2) → (CHP J1χ1 ∨ CHP J1χ2), (1)
|STIT CHP J1χ → CHP J2χ, (2)
|STIT (CHP J1χ1 ∧ CHP J1χ2) → CHP J1(χ1 ∧χ2), (3)
|STIT ¬CHP J, (4)
|STIT ¬CHP J⊥. (5)
Proof. We give the proof of Validity 2 as an example. Let M be a STIT-model and w ∈ W such that M, w | CHP J1 χ . We
have M, w | χ and M, w | ¬[AGT \ J1]χ . As RAGT\ J1 ⊆ RAGT\ J2 , it implies that M, w | ¬[AGT \ J2]χ . That is why we
have M, w | CHP J2χ . 
According to Validity 1, J1 could have prevented χ1 or χ2 to be true implies J1 could have prevented χ1 or could have
prevented χ2. Validity 2 expresses a monotonicity property: if J1 is a subset of J2 and J1 could have prevented χ then,
J2 could have prevented χ as well. Validity 3 shows how the operator CHP J behaves over conjunction: if J1 could have
prevented χ1 to be true and could have prevented χ2 to be true separately then J1 could have prevented χ1 and χ2 to
be true. Finally, according to the Validities 4 and 5, tautologies and contradictions cannot counterfactually depend on the
choice of a group: it is never the case that a coalition J could have prevented a tautology (resp. a contradiction).
4.2. Discussion
The following two sections discuss some aspects related to the analysis of counterfactual statements presented above.
We ﬁrst motivate why we chose STIT logic instead of concurrent logics such as Coalition Logic (CL) and ATL in order to
provide a formal representation of such statements. Then, we make a brief excursus on the notion of “partial responsibility
up to a certain degree”.
4.2.1. Limitations of CL compared to STIT
In recent times several logics of group actions and group abilities have been proposed. Roughly, we can distinguish two
families of such logics: those based on Coalition Logic (CL) [43], one for all Alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) [4] of
which several variants and extensions have been studied (see, e.g., [2,65,2,66]), and those based on STIT logic.
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esting point is that, while the statements:
1. “the group of agents J has a joint strategy that forces χ ” and,
2. “the group of agents J has not a joint strategy that forces χ ”
are expressible in STIT but also in CL and ATL, the statements:
3. “the group of agents J has chosen a joint strategy that forces χ ” and,
4. “the group of agents J did not choose a joint strategy that forces χ ”
are only expressible in STIT. More generally, while ATL and CL only support reasoning about what agents and coalitions of
agents can do together, STIT also allows to express what agents and coalitions of agents actually do together (see also [11]
for a discussion on this matter). In formal terms, the previous statements 1 and 2 are expressed in STIT by the formulas
〈∅〉[ J ]χ and ¬〈∅〉[ J ]χ , while the previous statements 3 and 4 are expressed in STIT by the formulas [ J ]χ and ¬[ J ]χ .
As emphasized in Section 4.1, a logical analysis of counterfactual emotions is necessarily based on a logical analysis of
counterfactual constructions of the form “agent i could have prevented χ to be true” which implies that:
5. “given what the agents in AGT \ {i} have chosen, there exists an alternative action of agent i such that, if agent i did
choose this action, the state of affairs χ would be false now”.
We have shown that the previous statement 5 is expressed in STIT by the formula ¬[AGT \ {i}]χ . As for statements 3 and 4
above, CL and ATL cannot express the previous statement 5. More generally, while STIT allows to express what agents and
coalitions of agents could have done and could have prevented, this cannot be expressed in CL and ATL.
4.2.2. Partial responsibility up to a certain degree
We have given above a logical translation of the statement “agent i could have prevented χ to be true” noted CHPi χ
which expresses a counterfactual dependence between the state of affairs χ and agent i’s choice.
It is worth noting that CHPi χ does not cover situations in which agent i is partially responsible for χ up to a certain de-
gree without being fully responsible for χ . The following voting example illustrates the difference between full responsibility
and partial responsibility.
Example 2. A and B are the two candidates for an election and 1, 2, 3 are the three voters. Suppose w7 in the STIT model
in Fig. 4 is the actual world. In this world, voter 1 and voter 2 vote for candidate A while voter 3 votes for candidate B
so that A wins the election against B by a vote of 2–1. Formulas CHP1 Awin and CHP2 Awin are true at w7. In fact, at w7
candidate A wins the elections and, given what the other voters have chosen, there exists an alternative action of voter 1
(i.e. voting for candidate B) such that, if voter 1 did choose this action, candidate A would not win the elections. In other
words, at w7 the result of the election counterfactually depends on 1’s vote. The same is true for voter 2: at w7 the result
of the election counterfactually depends on 2’s vote. In this case, voter 1 and voter 2 can be said to be fully responsible for
candidate A’s win.
Suppose now w5 in the STIT model in Fig. 4 is the actual world. At w5 candidate A wins the election against candidate
B by a vote of 3–0. In this case, CHPiAwin is false for every voter, that is, for every voter the result of the election does not
counterfactually depend on his vote. Nevertheless, we would like to say that each of the three voters is partially responsible
for candidate A’s win up to a certain degree. Indeed, voter 1 is a cause of A winning even if the vote is 3–0 because, under
the contingency that one of the other voters had voted for candidate B instead, voter 1’s vote would have become critical;
if he had then changed his vote, candidate A would not have won. The same is true for voter 2 and for voter 3.
It is not the objective of this paper to provide a logical account of the notion of partial responsibility and of the cor-
responding notion of degree of responsibility. These notions have been studied for instance in [16] in which the degree of
responsibility of an event A for an event B is supposed to be 1N+1 , where N is the minimal number of changes that have
to be made to the actual situation before B counterfactually depends on A. For instance, in the case of the 3–0 vote in the
previous example, the degree of responsibility of any voter for the victory of candidate A is 12 , since one change has to be
made to the actual situation before a vote is critical. In the case of the 2–1 vote, the degree of responsibility of any voter
for the victory is 1, since no change has to be made to the actual situation before a vote is critical.
5. A STIT extension with knowledge
In order to capture the subjective dimension of emotions, this section presents an extension of the fragment dfSTIT of
STIT logic presented in Section 3 with standard operators for knowledge of the form Ki , where i is an agent. The formula
Kiϕ means “agent i knows that ϕ is true”. This is a necessary step for the formalization of counterfactual emotions that will
be presented in Section 6.
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5.1. Deﬁnition
First we extend the language LSTIT of Section 3.1 with epistemic constructions Kiϕ . We give the language of all formulas
we can construct with STIT operators and knowledge operators. The language LKSTIT of the logic KSTIT is deﬁned by the
following BNF:
ϕ ::= p | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ¬ϕ | [ J ]ϕ | Kiϕ
where p ranges over ATM, i ranges over AGT and J over 2AGT .
For the same reasons than in Section 3.1, we are here interested in a fragment of LKSTIT . Indeed, the satisﬁability
problem of the logic KSTIT will be undecidable if the number of agents is more than 3 (because the logic KSTIT will be
a conservative extension of the logic STIT which is already undecidable). So we focus into a syntactic fragment we call
dfKSTIT.
The language LdfKSTIT of the logic dfKSTIT is deﬁned by the following BNF:
χ ::= ⊥ | p | χ ∧ χ | ¬χ (propositional formulas),
ψ ::= [ J ]χ | ψ ∧ ψ (see-to-it formulas),
ϕ ::= χ | ψ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ¬ϕ | 〈∅〉ψ | Kiϕ (see-to-it, “can”, knowledge formulas),
where p ranges over ATM, i ranges over AGT and J over 2AGT \ {∅}. For instance, K1〈∅〉[{1,2}]p ∈ LdfKSTIT . But
〈∅〉K1[{1,2}]p /∈ LdfKSTIT . Let us give the semantics of the logic dfKSTIT.
Deﬁnition 4 (KSTIT-model). A KSTIT-model is a tuple M = (W , {R J } J⊆AGT , {Ei}i∈AGT , V ) where:
• (W , {R J } J⊆AGT , V ) is a STIT-model (see Deﬁnition 1);
• For all i ∈ AGT , Ei is an equivalence relation.
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As usual truth conditions for atomic formulas and the boolean operators are entirely standard. Truth conditions for the
STIT operators [ J ] are given in Section 3. Truth conditions for knowledge operators are deﬁned in the standard way:
M,w | Kiϕ iff M, v | ϕ for all v ∈ W such that wEi v.
That is, agent i knows that ϕ at world w in model M if and only if ϕ is true at all worlds that are indistinguishable for
agent i at world w .
As usual, a formula ϕ is KSTIT-valid (noted |KSTIT ϕ) iff ϕ is true in every world of every KSTIT-model. A formula
ϕ is KSTIT-satisﬁable iff there exists a KSTIT-model M = (W , {R J } J⊆AGT , {Ei}i∈AGT , V ) and a world w ∈ W such that M,
w | ϕ .
5.2. Decidability
The following is an extension of Corollary 1 given in Section 3.4.
Theorem 3. The satisﬁability problem of dfKSTIT is NP-complete if card(AGT) = 1 and PSPACE-complete if card(AGT) 2.
5.3. Axiomatization
The study of an axiomatization for dfKSTIT relies on an epistemic extension of the logic NCL presented in Section 3.3
which will also be axiomatizable. We call KNCL this epistemic extension of NCL. The syntax of the logic KNCL is the same
as the logic KSTIT, that is to say LKNCL = LKSTIT .
Let us now give the deﬁnition of model for the logic KNCL.
Deﬁnition 5 ( KNCL-model). A KNCL-model is a tuple M = (W , {R J } J⊆AGT , {Ei}i∈AGT , V ) where:
• (W , {R J } J⊆AGT , V ) is a NCL-model (see Deﬁnition 3);
• For all i ∈ AGT , Ei is an equivalence relation.
Truth conditions, validity and satisﬁability in KNCL are deﬁned as usual. We can now prove an extension of Theorem 2,
stating the equivalence between the satisﬁability in KNCL and the satisﬁability in KSTIT if we restrict the formula to the
syntactic fragment LdfKSTIT .
Theorem 4. Let ϕ be a formula of LdfKSTIT . We have equivalence between:
• ϕ is satisﬁable in KNCL;
• ϕ is satisﬁable in KSTIT.
In the same way, we have an extension of Corollary 2 about a complete axiomatization of the logic dfKSTIT.
Corollary 3. A formula ϕ in LdfKSTIT is KSTIT-valid iff we have KNCL ϕ where KNCL ϕ means that there exists a proof of ϕ using all
principles of the logic NCL, and all principles of modal logic S5 for every Ki .
Of course, as for LdfSTIT , a proof of a formula ϕ in LdfKSTIT can contain formulas of LKSTIT that are not in LdfKSTIT .
6. A formalization of counterfactual emotions
In Section 2.2 we have provided an overview of psychological theories of counterfactual emotions and discussed deﬁni-
tions which are shared by most psychologists working in this area. In the following sections, we will use the STIT fragment
extended with epistemic operators studied in Section 5 and called dfKSTIT, in order to provide a logical formalization of
this class of emotions. We consider four types of counterfactual emotions: regret and its positive counterpart rejoicing,
disappointment and its positive counterpart elation.
6.1. Regret and rejoicing
In order to provide a logical characterization of counterfactual emotions such as regret, we need to introduce a concept
of agent’s preference. Modal operators for desires and goals have been widely studied (see e.g. [17,41]). The disadvantage of
such approaches is that they complicate the underlying logical framework. An alternative, which we adopt in this paper is
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of preference between worlds.
Let us introduce a special atom goodi for every agent i ∈ AGT . These atoms are used to specify those worlds which are
good for an agent.
We say that χ is good for agent i if and only if χ is true in all good/pleasant states for agent i. Formally:
GOODiχ
def= [∅](goodi → χ).
Now, we are in a position to deﬁne the concept of desirable state of affairs. We say that χ is desirable for agent i if and
only if, i knows that χ is something good for him:
DESiχ
def= KiGOODiχ.
As the following valid formulas highlight, every operator DESi satisﬁes the principle K of normal modal logic, and the
properties of positive and negative introspection: χ is (resp. is not) desirable for i if and only if i knows this.
|KSTIT
(
DESiχ1 ∧ DESi(χ1 → χ2)
)→ DESiχ2, (6)
|KSTIT DESiχ ↔ KiDESiχ, (7)
|KSTIT ¬DESiχ ↔ Ki¬DESiχ. (8)
We have now all necessary and suﬃcient ingredients to deﬁne the cognitive structure of regret and to specify its counter-
factual dimension. As emphasized in Section 2.2, such a dimension has been widely studied in the psychological literature
where several authors agree in considering regret as the emotion originating from an agent’s comparison between the ac-
tual bad outcome and a counterfactual good outcome that might have been had the agent chosen a different action (see,
e.g., [37,59,48,33,32,71]).
We say that an agent i regrets for χ if and only if ¬χ is desirable for i and i knows that it could have prevented χ to
be true now. Formally:
REGRETi χ
def= DESi¬χ ∧ KiCHPiχ.
The following is the semantic counterpart of the previous syntactic deﬁnition of regret. We have that M, w | REGRETi χ
if and only if for all v ∈ Ei(w) it holds that:
• for all u ∈ R∅(v), if M,u | goodi then M,u | ¬χ ;
• M, v | χ and there is u ∈ RAGT\{i}(v) such that M,u | ¬χ .
The former condition captures the motivational aspect of regret: if at world w agent i regrets for χ then, for every situation
that agent i considers possible at w , ¬χ is pleasant for him. The latter condition captures the counterfactual aspect of
regret: if at world w agent i regrets for χ then, for every situation that agent i considers possible at w , χ is true and, given
what the other agents have chosen, there exists an alternative action of i such that, if i did choose this action, χ would be
false now.
The following example is given in order to better clarify our logical deﬁnition of regret.
Example 3. Consider the popular two-person hand game “Rock-paper-scissors”. Each of the two players AGT = {1,2} has
three available actions: play rock, play paper, play scissors. The goal of each player is to select an action which defeats
that of the opponent. Combinations of actions are resolved as follows: rock wins against scissors, paper wins against rock;
scissors wins against paper. If both players choose the same action, they both lose. The scenario is represented in the STIT
model in Fig. 5. It is supposed winning is something good for each agent and each agent has the desire to win the game:
GOOD1 1Win, GOOD2 2Win, DES1 1Win and DES2 2Win are true at worlds w1–w9. Suppose world w1 is the actual world in
which 1 plays rock and 2 plays paper. In this world 1 loses the game (¬1Win), and 1 knows that (by playing scissors) it
could have prevented ¬1Win to be true (i.e. K1CHP1¬1Win is true at w1). It follows that at w1 player 1 regrets for having
lost the game, that is, REGRET1¬1Win is true at w1.
As the following validity highlights, regret implies the frustration of an agent’s desire:
|KSTIT REGRETi χ → (Kiχ ∧ DESi¬χ). (9)
More precisely, if agent i regrets for χ then, i knows that χ holds and ¬χ is something desirable for i (in this sense i feels
frustrated for not having achieved ¬χ ). Moreover, regret satisﬁes the properties of positive and negative introspection:
|KSTIT REGRETi χ ↔ KiREGRETi χ, (10)
|KSTIT ¬REGRETi χ ↔ Ki¬REGRETi χ. (11)
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sake of simplicity, we suppose that players 1 and 2 do not have uncertainty: everywhere in the model players 1 and 2 only consider possible the world in
which they are (reﬂexive arrows represent indistinguishability relations for the two players).
As emphasized by some psychological theories of counterfactual emotions (see, e.g., [68,69]), the positive counterpart of
regret is rejoicing: while regret has a negative valence (i.e. it is associated with the frustration of an agent’s desire), rejoicing
has a positive valence (i.e. it is associated with the satisfaction of an agent’s desire). According to these theories, a person
experiences regret when believing that the foregone outcome would have been better if she did a different action, whilst
she rejoices when believing that the foregone outcome would have been worse if she did a different action. More precisely,
an agent i rejoices for χ if and only if, χ is desirable for i and, i knows that it could have prevented χ to be true now by
choosing a different action:
REJOICEi χ
def= DESi χ ∧ KiCHPiχ.
In semantic terms, we have that M, w | REJOICEi χ if and only if for all v ∈ Ei(w) it holds that:
• for all u ∈ R∅(v), if M, u | goodi then M, u | χ ;
• M, v | χ and there is u ∈ RAGT\{i}(v) such that M, u | ¬χ .
The former condition corresponds to the motivational dimension of rejoicing, while the latter corresponds to the counterfac-
tual dimension. According to the former condition: if at world w agent i rejoices for χ then, for every situation that agent
i considers possible at w , χ is pleasant for him. According to the latter condition: if at world w agent i rejoices for χ then,
for every situation that agent i considers possible at w , χ is true and, given what the other agents have chosen, there exists
an alternative action of i such that, if i did choose this action, χ would be false now.
Example 4. Consider again the game “Rock-paper-scissors” represented by the STIT-model in Fig. 5. Suppose world w2 is
the actual world in which player 1 plays rock and player 2 plays scissors. In this world player 1 is the winner (1Win) and
it knows that (by playing paper or scissors) it could have prevented 1Win to be true (i.e. K1CHP1 1Win is true at w2). Since
DES1 1Win holds at w2, it follows that at w2 player 1 rejoices for having won the game, that is, REJOICE1 1Win is true
at w2.
The following validity highlights that rejoicing implies desire satisfaction:
|KSTIT REJOICEi χ → (Kiχ ∧ DESi χ). (12)
More precisely, if agent i rejoices for χ then, i knows that χ and χ is something desirable for i (in this sense i
feels satisﬁed for having achieved χ ). Like regret, rejoicing satisﬁes the properties of positive and negative introspec-
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|KSTIT REJOICEi χ ↔ KiREJOICEi χ, (13)
|KSTIT ¬REJOICEi χ ↔ Ki¬REJOICEiχ. (14)
That is, agent i rejoices (resp. does not rejoice) for χ if and only if it knows this.
6.2. Disappointment and elation
As emphasized in Section 2.2, according to some authors [38,19,70], disappointment too is part of the family of counter-
factual emotions: like regret, disappointment originates from the comparison between the actual outcome and a counter-
factual outcome that might have occurred. However, there is an important difference between regret and disappointment.
If an agent feels regret he considers himself to be responsible for the actual outcome, whereas if he feels disappointed he
considers external events and other agents’ actions to be responsible for the actual outcome.
Thus, we can say that an agent i feels disappointed for χ if and only if ¬χ is desirable for i and i knows that the others
could have prevented χ to be true now. Formally:
DISAPPOINTMENTi χ
def= DESi¬χ ∧ KiCHPAGT\{i}χ.
In semantic terms, we have that M, w | DISAPPOINTMENTi χ if and only if for all v ∈ Ei(w) it holds that:
• for all u ∈ R∅(v), if M,u | goodi then M,u | ¬χ ;
• M, v | χ and there is u ∈ R{i}(v) such that M, u | ¬χ .
Like in the cases of regret and rejoicing, the former condition captures the motivational aspect of disappointment, while the
latter captures the counterfactual aspect. According to the former condition: if at world w agent i feels disappointed for χ
then, for every situation that agent i considers possible at w , ¬χ is pleasant for him. According to the latter condition: if
at world w agent i feels disappointed for χ then, for every situation that agent i considers possible at w , χ is true and,
given what i has chosen, there exists an alternative joint action of the other agents such that, if they did choose this action,
χ would be false now.
Example 5. In the “Rock-paper-scissors” game represented in Fig. 5, regret is always joined with disappointment. For in-
stance, at world w1 player 1 not only regrets for having lost the game (i.e. REGRET1¬1Win), but also he feels disappointed
for this (i.e. DISAPPOINTMENT1¬1Win). In fact, at w1, 1 knows that (by playing scissors) the others (i.e. player 2) could
have prevented ¬1Win to be true (i.e. K1CHPAGT\{1}¬1Win is true at w1).
Like regret and rejoicing, disappointment satisﬁes the properties of positive and negative introspection:
|KSTIT DISAPPOINTMENTi χ ↔ KiDISAPPOINTMENTi χ, (15)
|KSTIT ¬DISAPPOINTMENTi χ ↔ Ki¬DISAPPOINTMENTi χ. (16)
Moreover, like regret, disappointment implies desire frustration:
|KSTIT DISAPPOINTMENTi χ → (Kiχ ∧ DESi¬χ). (17)
It is worth noting that regret and disappointment do not necessarily occur in parallel, i.e. the formulas REGRETi χ ∧
¬DISAPPOINTMENTi χ and ¬REGRETi χ ∧ DISAPPOINTMENTi χ are satisﬁable. The following example illustrates the
situation in which an agent feels disappointed without feeling regret.
Example 6. Two agents AGT = {1,2} have made an appointment to dine together at a restaurant. When the time of the
appointment comes near, each of the two agents can either go to the restaurant in order to meet the other, or stay home,
or go to the cinema. The two agents will have dinner together only if each of them decides to go to restaurant to meet
the other. The scenario is represented in the STIT model in Fig. 6. It is supposed that having dinner with agent 2 is
something good for agent 1 and agent 1 desires to have dinner with agent 2: GOOD1 dinnerTogether and DES1 dinnerTogether
are true at worlds w1–w9. Suppose world w1 is the actual world in which 1 goes to the restaurant, while 2 goes to
the cinema and breaks his appointment with 1. In this world 1 does not have dinner with 2 (¬dinnerTogether), and 1
knows that (by going to the restaurant) the others (i.e. agent 2) could have prevented ¬dinnerTogether to be true (i.e.
K1CHPAGT\{1}¬dinnerTogether is true at w1). It follows that at w1 agent 1 feels disappointed for not having dinner with
2, that is, DISAPPOINTMENT1¬dinnerTogether is true at w1. Note that at w1 agent 1 does not feel regret for not having
dinner with agent 2 (i.e. REGRET1¬dinnerTogether is false at w1). In fact, at w1, 1 knows that ¬dinnerTogether only depends
on what 2 has decided to do. Therefore, at w1, 1 does not think that he could have prevented ¬dinnerTogether to be true
(i.e. ¬K1CHP1¬dinnerTogether is true at w1).
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In this example, we suppose that agents 1 and 2 can only have uncertainty about the current choice of the other (vertical dotted rectangles represent
indistinguishability relations for agent 1, whereas horizontal dotted rectangles represent indistinguishability relations for agent 2).
We conclude with a formalization of the positive counterpart of disappointment, that is commonly called elation [68,69].
We say that agent i elates for χ if and only if, χ is desirable for i and i knows that the others could have prevented χ to
be true now:
ELATIONi χ
def= DESi χ ∧ Ki CHPAGT\{i}χ.
In semantic terms, we have that M, w | ELATIONi χ if and only if for all v ∈ Ei(w) it holds that:
• for all u ∈ R∅(v), if M, u | goodi then M, u | χ ;
• M, v | χ and there is u ∈ R{i}(v) such that M, u | ¬χ .
Like in the cases of regret, rejoicing and disappointment, the former condition captures the motivational aspect of elation
while the latter captures the counterfactual aspect. According to the former condition: if at world w agent i elates for χ
then, for every situation that agent i considers possible at w , χ is pleasant for him. According to the latter condition: if at
world w agent i elates for χ then, for every situation that agent i considers possible at w , χ is true and, given what i has
chosen, there exists an alternative joint action of the other agents such that, if they did choose this action, χ would be false
now.
Like regret, rejoicing and disappointment, elation satisﬁes the properties of positive and negative introspection:
|KSTIT ELATIONi χ ↔ KiELATIONi χ, (18)
|KSTIT ¬ELATIONi χ ↔ Ki¬ELATIONi χ. (19)
Moreover, like rejoicing, elation implies desire satisfaction:
|KSTIT ELATIONi χ → (Kiχ ∧ DESi χ). (20)
Finally, like regret and disappointment, elation and rejoicing do not necessarily occur in parallel, i.e. the formulas
REJOICEi χ ∧ ¬ELATIONi χ and ¬REJOICEi χ ∧ ELATIONi χ are satisﬁable. In fact, an agent might consider the others
to be responsible for the actual good situation, without considering himself to be responsible for the actual good situation.
Before concluding, it is worth noting that the constructions REGRETi χ and REJOICEi χ require group STIT operators.
This justiﬁes the use of Horty’s STIT logic with agents and groups, and the study of a decidable fragment of this logic
provided in Section 3. On the contrary, Belnap et al.’s individual STIT logic [9] extended by knowledge operators would
be suﬃcient to write the formulas DISAPPOINTMENTi χ and ELATIONi χ . Let us recall that the fusion of two decidable
modal logics is decidable [24]. As the satisﬁability problem of Belnap et al.’s individual STIT logic is decidable [7], the
fusion of the latter and epistemic logic is also decidable. So, it is not necessary to introduce syntactic restrictions on the
STIT language in order to obtain a decidable logic in which we can reason about disappointment and elation.
6.3. Discussion
Let us discuss some aspects we did not consider in the previous formalization of counterfactual emotions.
According to [14], disappointment entails invalidation of an agent’s positive expectation. That is, an agent feels disap-
pointed for χ , only if ¬χ is desirable for the agent and the agent believes that χ , and in the previous state he believed
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and he just learnt that χ is true and, before learning that χ is true, he believed ¬χ to be true in the next state. In the
formalization of disappointment proposed in Section 6.2, this relationship between disappointment and expectations was
not considered. We included in the deﬁnition of disappointment only the agent’s mental states at the moment in which the
emotion arises.
Another aspect we did not consider in our formalization of counterfactual emotions is the distinction between regret
due to a choice to act (i.e. action) and regret due to a choice not to act (i.e. inaction). A classical example which clariﬁes this
distinction is the one given by [34] in which an agent i owned shares in company A, and he considered switching to stock
in company B but he decided against it. He now ﬁnds out that he would have been better off if he had switched to the stock
of company B (regret due to inaction). Another agent j owned shares in company B, and he switched to stock in company A.
He now ﬁnds out that he would have been better off if he had kept his stock in Company B (regret due to action). The logic
STIT is not suﬃciently expressive to make this distinction between regret due to action and regret due to inaction. Indeed,
in STIT logic it is supposed that at a given state w every agent has made a choice. Moreover, STIT allows to reason about
the effects of the agents’ choices at a given state. Nevertheless, STIT does not allow to distinguish the situation in which, at
a given state, an agent has made the choice to act from the situation in which the agent has made the choice not to act.
7. A concrete example
The logical framework and formal analysis of counterfactual emotions proposed in this paper can also be exploited for
increasing the competence and performance of artiﬁcial emotional agents in emotion recognition, emotion anticipation,
response to others’ emotions and emotion communication and expression. Such capabilities are fundamental for developing
interactive agent technologies which are particularly relevant for applications in health care, education and entertainment,
like intelligent tutoring systems, robotic assistants to older or disabled people to improve quality of life, companions and
trainers in physical recovery and rehabilitation, etc. This section exposes more in detail how the results of the present
research can be exploited in order to design agents endowed with these capabilities.
We imagine a scenario of human-agent interaction in which an intelligent tutoring agent has to take care of a human
user. The tutoring agent has to reason about and to respond to the user’s emotions in order to sustain the user’s activity.
Here we only focus on some particular competencies of the artiﬁcial agent, namely: the capacity of inferring the user’s
emotions by attributing mental states to the user; the capacity of adapting its behavior during the dialogue with the user
in order to reduce the user’s negative emotions and in order to induce positive emotions on the user.
7.1. Inferring the user’s emotion through the attribution of mental states
The human user in this scenario is a student who has to pass a Certiﬁcate of Proﬁciency in English. The tutoring agent is
an artiﬁcial agent who supervises the student’s preparation for the exam. The tutoring agent is endowed with the capability
of reasoning about the student’s emotions.
Let us suppose that, according to the tutoring agent (noted t): the user (noted u) would like to pass the exam, the user
knows that he did not pass the exam, the user knows that necessarily if he studied then he would have passed the exam,
and the user knows that he had the opportunity to study. Thus, the tutoring agent’s knowledge base KB can be formally
represented by the conjunction of the following four formulas:
• KtDESupassu
• KtKu¬passu
• KtKu[∅]([u]studiedu → passu)
• KtKu〈∅〉[u]studiedu .
Note that all the four formulas are in LdfKSTIT , even the third one which is equivalent to KtKu¬〈∅〉([u]studiedu ∧ ¬passu).
We can prove that from its initial knowledge base, the tutoring agent infers that the user is feeling regret for having failed
the exam, that is
|KSTIT KB → KtREGRETu¬passu (21)
Now let us suppose that, according to the tutoring agent: the user would like to pass the exam, the user knows that
he passed the exam, the user knows that necessarily if he did not study then he would have failed the exam, and the
user knows that he had the opportunity not to study. Thus, the tutoring agent’s knowledge base KB∗ can be formally
represented by the conjunction of the following four formulas:
• KtDESupassu
• KtKupassu
• KtKu[∅]([u]¬studiedu → ¬passu)
• KtKu〈∅〉[u]¬studiedu .
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exam, that is
|KSTIT KB∗ → Kt REJOICEu passu. (22)
We have only considered a tutoring agent’s capability of inferring a human user’s emotions by the attribution of mental
states to the user. However, there are other important capabilities that a tutoring agent interacting with a human user
should be endowed with. In particular, the tutoring agent should be able to communicate with the human user in such a
way that it can adapt its behavior in order to reduce the user’s negative emotions and in order to induce positive emotions
on the user. In order to model this kind of capability, we discuss in the next section an extension of our logical framework
that allows to represent the exchange of information between a tutoring agent and a human user.
7.2. A ‘dynamiﬁcation’ of KSTIT
We present a dynamic variant of the logic of Section 5, where knowledge is updated, as in public announcement logic
(PAL) [45,67] and, more precisely, as in the variant of PAL proposed by [63,64] where model update is redeﬁned as an
epistemic relation-changing operation of ‘link cutting’ that does not throw away worlds from a model.
The logic KSTIT of Section 5 is here extended by dynamic operators of the form [‖θ‖]. The formula [‖θ‖]ϕ means ‘after
announcement of the truth value of θ , ϕ holds’. The dual of [‖θ‖] is 〈||θ ||〉, that is, 〈||θ ||〉ϕ def= ¬[‖θ‖]¬ϕ . We call KSTIT+ the
extended logic. The language LKSTIT+ of the logic KSTIT+ is deﬁned by the following BNF:
ϕ ::= p | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ¬ϕ | [ J ]ϕ | Kiϕ |
[‖ϕ‖]ϕ
where p ranges over ATM, i ranges over AGT and J over 2AGT .
We are interested here in a decidable and ﬁnitely axiomatizable fragment of KSTIT+ called dfKSTIT+ , which is nothing
else than the dynamic extension of the syntactic fragment dfKSTIT of the logic KSTIT studied in Section 5.
χ ::= ⊥ | p | χ ∧ χ | ¬χ (propositional formulas),
ψ ::= [ J ]χ | ψ ∧ ψ (see-to-it formulas),
ϕ ::= χ | ψ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ¬ϕ | 〈∅〉ψ | Kiϕ |
[‖ϕ‖]ϕ (see-to-it, “can”, knowledge, update formulas),
where p ranges over ATM, i ranges over AGT and J over 2AGT \ {∅}.
The standard announcement operator [!θ] of PAL can be deﬁned from the operator [‖θ‖] in a straightforward manner:
[!θ]ϕ def= θ → [‖θ‖]ϕ.
Formula [!θ]ϕ has to be read ‘after the announcement of θ , ϕ holds’. Indeed, the announcement of θ is nothing else than
the announcement of the truth value of θ when θ is true. The dual of [!θ] is 〈!θ〉, that is, 〈!θ〉ϕ def= ¬[!θ]¬ϕ .
In order to give semantics to the operators [‖θ‖] we deﬁne the elements of the model M‖θ‖ which results from the
update of the model M = (W , {R J } J⊆AGT , {Ei}i∈AGT , V ) by the announcement of θ ’s truth value:
• W ‖θ‖ = W ;
• for every J ⊆ AGT , R‖θ‖J = R J ;
• for every i ∈ AGT , E‖θ‖i = {(w, v)|(w, v) ∈ Ei and (M,w | θ iff M, v | θ)};
• V ‖θ‖ = V .
Basically, the effect of the announcement of θ ’s truth value is to remove the epistemic links between all worlds u and v in
which θ does not have the same truth value. In other words, for every world w in which θ is true and for every agent i,
the effect of the operation ‖θ‖ is to restrict the set of epistemically possible worlds for i to the set of worlds in which θ
is true; for every world w in which θ is false and for every agent i, the effect of the operation ‖θ‖ is to restrict the set of
epistemically possible worlds for i to the set of worlds in which θ is false.
It is just a routine to verify that the operation ‖θ‖ is well-deﬁned, as it preserves the semantic constraints on KSTIT-
models, that is, if M is a KSTIT-model then M‖θ‖ is a KSTIT-model too.
The following are the truth conditions of the dynamic operators [‖θ‖]:
M,w | [‖θ‖]ϕ iff M‖θ‖,w | ϕ.
Note that under these truth conditions [‖θ‖]ϕ is equivalent to 〈||θ ||〉ϕ . Validity of a formula ϕ in KSTIT+ (noted |KSTIT+ ϕ)
is deﬁned in the usual way.






[‖θ‖](ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) ↔ ([‖θ‖]ϕ1 ∧ [‖θ‖]ϕ2),
(Red[ J ])
[‖θ‖][ J ]ϕ ↔ [ J ][‖θ‖]ϕ,
(RedKi )
[‖θ‖]Kiϕ ↔ ((θ → Ki(θ → [‖θ‖]ϕ))∧ (¬θ → Ki(¬θ → [‖θ‖]ϕ))).







The ﬁve equivalences of Proposition 2 together with the rule of replacement of proved equivalents provide a complete
set of reduction axioms for the dynamic operators [‖θ‖]. We call red the mapping which iteratively applies the above equiv-
alences from the left to the right, starting from one of the innermost modal operators. red pushes the dynamic operators
inside the formula, and ﬁnally eliminates them when facing an atomic formula.
The mapping red is inductively deﬁned by:
1. red(p) = p
2. red(¬ϕ) = ¬red(ϕ)
3. red(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = red(ϕ1) ∧ red(ϕ2)
4. red([ J ]ϕ) = [ J ]red(ϕ)
5. red(Kiϕ) = Ki red(ϕ)
6. red([‖θ‖]p) = p
7. red([‖θ‖]¬ϕ) = red(¬[‖θ‖]ϕ)
8. red([‖θ‖](ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)) = red([‖θ‖]ϕ1 ∧ [‖θ‖]ϕ2)
9. red([‖θ‖][ J ]ϕ) = red([ J ][‖θ‖]ϕ)
10. red([‖θ‖]Kiϕ) = red((θ → Ki(θ → [‖θ‖]ϕ)) ∧ (¬θ → Ki(¬θ → [‖θ‖]ϕ)))
11. red([‖θ‖][‖‖]ϕ) = red([‖θ‖]red([‖‖]ϕ)).
The following Proposition 3 is a straightforward consequence of Proposition 2 and the fact that the following rule of
replacement of proved equivalents preserves validity:
ϕ1 ↔ ϕ2
ϕ ↔ ϕ[ϕ1 := ϕ2]
where ϕ[ϕ1 := ϕ2] is the formula ϕ in which we have replaced all occurrences of ϕ1 by ϕ2.
Proposition 3. Let ϕ ∈ LKSTIT+ . Then, red(ϕ) ↔ ϕ is KSTIT+-valid.
The following Proposition 4 is necessary in order to prove the completeness of the logic dfKSTIT+ .
Proposition 4. Let ϕ ∈ LdfKSTIT+ . Then, red(ϕ) ∈ LdfKSTIT .
Corollary 4. The validities of dfKSTIT+ are completely axiomatized by the axioms and inference rules of dfKSTIT provided in Corol-
lary 3 together with the reduction axioms of Proposition 2 and the rule of replacement of proved equivalents.
Decidability of the logic of dfKSTIT+ follows straightforwardly from the known decidability of the base logic dfKSTIT
(Theorem 3) and from Propositions 3 and 4. Indeed, red provides an effective procedure for reducing a dfKSTIT+-formula ϕ
into an equivalent dfKSTIT-formula red(ϕ).
Corollary 5. The satisﬁability problem of dfKSTIT+ is decidable.
7.3. Adapting behavior during a dialogue with the user
It has to be noted that in PAL announcements are usually viewed as communicative actions performed by an agent that
is ‘outside the system’, i.e. that is not part of the set of agents AGT under consideration. However, communicative actions
performed by agents in AGT can be modelled in PAL by considering a particular subset of announcements of agents’ mental
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the announcement of the formula Kiϕ . Thus, we write say(i,ϕ) instead of !Kiϕ , and [say(i,ϕ)]ψ abbreviates [!Kiϕ]ψ . In
other words, we here identify agent i’s act of announcing that ϕ with the announcement of the fact that i knows that ϕ .
A similar point of view is taken by [3].
The dynamic extension of the logic KSTIT presented in Section 7.2 can easily incorporate rules which specify how, during
a dialogue with a human user, an artiﬁcial agent should adapt its behavior depending on the expected effects of certain
dialogue moves on the user’s emotions.
In order to formalize this kind of rules in our logic, we introduce a function Pre such that, for every formula θ in
LdfKSTIT+ , Pre(θ) is the feasibility (or executability) precondition of the public announcement of θ . We denote with 〈〈!θ〉〉ϕ the
fact ‘the public announcement of θ will possibly occur, and ϕ will be true afterwards’, and we deﬁne it as follows:
〈〈!θ〉〉ϕ def= Pre(θ) ∧ 〈!θ〉ϕ.
Consequently, 〈〈!θ〉〉 is logically equivalent to Pre(θ) ∧ θ , that is, the public announcement of θ will possibly occur if and
only if its feasibility precondition holds and θ is true. As we here identify the event “agent i announces that ϕ is true” (i.e.
say(i,ϕ)) with the announcement of the formula Kiϕ (i.e. !Kiϕ), 〈〈say(i,ϕ)〉〉ψ abbreviates 〈〈!Kiϕ〉〉ψ .
Remark. Note that the deﬁnition of the operator 〈〈!θ〉〉 forces agents to be sincere when performing a speech act. In particu-
lar, we have that an agent i will possibly announce that ϕ is true (i.e. 〈〈say(i,ϕ)〉〉) only if i knows that ϕ is true (i.e. Kiϕ).
This assumption about sincerity is however acceptable for the scenario introduced in Section 7.1 in which a tutoring agent
which has to take care of a human user can be reasonably supposed to be cooperative and sincere with the human user.
Let us go back to the scenario introduced in Section 7.1. We suppose that in this scenario the tutoring agent’s decision
to perform a certain dialogue move depends on the tutoring agent’s expectations about the effects of this dialogue move on
the human user’s emotions. In particular, we suppose that:
• the tutoring agent t will possibly tell to the human user u that he passed the exam if and only if, t knows that by
telling to u that he passed the exam u will rejoice for having passed the exam and that at the present stage u does not
rejoice for having passed the exam;
• the tutoring agent t will possibly tell to the human user u that he failed the exam if and only if, t knows that by telling
to u that he failed the exam u will not regret for having failed the exam.









Let us ﬁrst suppose that, according to the tutoring agent: the user would like to pass the exam, the user does not know
whether he passed the exam, the user knows that necessarily if studied then he would have passed the exam, and the user
knows that he had the opportunity to study. Moreover, the tutoring agent knows that the user failed the exam. Thus, the
tutoring agent’s knowledge base KB∗∗ can be formally represented by the conjunction of the following ﬁve formulas:
• KtDESupassu
• Kt(¬Kupassu ∧ ¬Ku¬passu)
• KtKu[∅]([u]studiedu → passu)
• KtKu〈∅〉[u]studiedu
• Kt¬passu .
The following validity highlights that, given its knowledge base KB∗∗ , the tutoring agent will refrain from telling to the
user that he failed the exam.




Now let us suppose that, according to the tutoring agent: the user would like to pass the exam, the user does not know
whether he passed the exam, the user knows that necessarily if did not study then he would have failed the exam, and
the user knows that he had the opportunity not to study. Moreover, the tutoring agent knows that the user passed the
exam. Thus, the tutoring agent’s knowledge base KB∗∗∗ can be formally represented by the conjunction of the following
ﬁve formulas:
• KtDESu passu
• Kt(¬Ku passu ∧ ¬Ku¬passu)
• KtKu[∅]([u]¬studiedu → ¬passu)
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• Kt passu .
The following validity highlights that, given its knowledge base KB∗∗∗ , the tutoring agent will possibly tell to the user that







As emphasized in the introduction emotion is a very active ﬁeld in AI. Several computational architectures of affective
agents have been proposed in the last few years (see, e.g., [46,21,18]). The cognitive architecture EMA (Emotion and Adap-
tion) [27] is one of the best example of research in this area. EMA deﬁnes a domain independent taxonomy of appraisal
variables stressing the many different relations between emotion and cognition, by enabling a wide range of internal ap-
praisal and coping processes used for reinterpretation, shift of motivations, goal reconsideration, etc. EMA also deals with
complex social emotions based on attributions of responsibility such as guilt and shame.
There are also several researchers who have developed formal languages which allow to reason about emotions and to
model affective agents. We discuss here some of the most important formal approaches to emotions and compare them
with our approach.
Meyer et al.’s logic of emotions. One of the most prominent formal analysis of emotions is the one proposed by Meyer et
al. [40,58,62]. In order to formalize emotions, they exploit the logical framework KARO [41]: a framework based on a blend
of dynamic logic with epistemic logic, enriched with modal operators for motivational attitudes such as desires and goals.
In Meyer et al.’s approach each instance of emotion is represented with a special predicate, or ﬂuent, in the jargon of
reasoning about action and change, to indicate that these predicates change over time. For every ﬂuent a set of effects
of the corresponding emotions on the agent’s planning strategies are speciﬁed, as well as the preconditions for triggering
the emotion. The latter correspond to generation rules for emotions. For instance, in [40] generation rules for four basic
emotions are given: joy, sadness, anger and fear, depending on the agent’s plans. More recently [62], generation rules for
social emotions such as guilt and shame have been proposed.
Contrarily to Meyer et al.’s approach, in our logic there are no speciﬁc formal constructs, like special predicates or ﬂuents,
which are used to denote that a certain emotion arises at a certain time. We just deﬁne the appraisal pattern of a given
emotion in terms of some cognitive constituents such as desire and knowledge. For instance, according to our deﬁnition of
regret, an agent regrets for χ if and only if, he desires ¬χ and, i knows that it could have prevented χ to be true now. In
other words, following the so-called appraisal theories in psychology (see Section 2), in our approach an emotion is reduced
to its appraisal variables which can be deﬁned through the basic concepts of a BDI logic (e.g. knowledge, belief, desires,
intentions).
It has to be noted that, although Meyer et al. provide a detailed formal analysis of emotions, they do not take into account
counterfactual emotions. This is also due to some intrinsic limitations of the KARO framework in expressing counterfactual
reasoning and statements of the form “agent i could have prevented χ to be true” which are fundamental constituents of
this kind of emotions. Indeed, standard dynamic logic on the top of which KARO is built, is not suited to express such
statements. In contrast to that, our STIT-based approach overcomes this limitation.
Note also that while Meyer et al. do not prove completeness and do not study complexity of their logic of emotions,
these are central issues in our work. As emphasized in the introduction of the article, our aim is to develop a logic which is
suﬃciently expressive to capture the fundamental constituents of counterfactual emotions and, at the same time, with good
mathematical properties in terms of decidability and complexity.
Other logical approaches to emotions. Adam et al. [1] have recently exploited a BDI logic in order to provide a logical formal-
ization of the emotion types deﬁned in Ortony, Clore and Collins’s model (OCC model) [42] (see Section 2.1 for a discussion
of this model). Similarly to our approach, in Adam et al.’s approach emotion types are deﬁned in terms of some primitive
concepts (and corresponding modal operators) such as the concepts of belief, desire, and action which allow to capture
the different appraisal variables of emotions proposed in the OCC model such as the desirability of an event, probability
of an event, and degree of responsibility of the author of an action. However, Adam et al. do not consider counterfactual
emotions. In fact, the logic proposed by Adam et al. is not suﬃciently expressive to capture counterfactual thinking about
agents’ choices and actions on which emotions like regret, rejoicing, disappointment and elation are based. Moreover, this
is due to some limitations of the OCC typology which does not contain deﬁnitions of emotions based on counterfactual
thinking such as regret and rejoicing.
In [20] a formal approach to emotions based on fuzzy logic is proposed. The main contribution of this work is a quan-
tiﬁcation of emotional intensity based on appraisal variables like desirability of an event and its likelihood. For example,
following [42], in FLAME the variables affecting the intensity of hope with respect to the occurrence of a certain event
are the degree to which the expected event is desirable, and the likelihood of the event. However, in FLAME only basic
emotions like joy, sadness, fear and hope are considered and there is no formal analysis of counterfactual emotions as the
ones analyzed in our work.
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A logical framework which allows to formalize and to reason about counterfactual emotions has been proposed in this
article. This framework is based on a decidable and ﬁnitely axiomatizable fragment of STIT logic called dfSTIT. We have
shown that an epistemic extension of dfSTIT called dfKSTIT is suﬃciently expressive to capture the fundamental con-
stituents of counterfactual emotions and, at the same time, it has good mathematical properties in terms of complexity and
axiomatizability. We have proved that the satisﬁability problem of dfKSTIT is NP-complete if card(AGT) = 1 and PSPACE-
complete if card(AGT) 2. This ﬁrst result is fundamental in order to claim that we can write down algorithms in dfKSTIT
to reason about counterfactual emotions such as regret, rejoicing, disappointment and elation. Moreover, we have provided
a complete axiomatization of dfKSTIT logic. This second result is also important because it shows that we can perform syn-
tactic reasoning in dfKSTIT about counterfactual emotions. We hope that the analysis developed in this paper will be useful
for improving understanding of affective phenomena and will offer an interesting perspective on computational modeling
of affective agents and systems.
Directions for our future research are manifold. The STIT fragment studied in Section 3 has an interesting expressivity,
as it allows to capture subtle aspects of counterfactual reasoning about agents’ choices. However, the reader may remark
that there is a gap between the complexity of the satisﬁability problem of a formula in dfSTIT (NP-complete) and the
complexity of the satisﬁability problem of a formula in dfKSTIT (PSPACE-complete). Of course, the complexity for dfKSTIT
cannot be improved because the satisﬁability problem of S5n is already PSPACE-complete. An interesting open question is
to identify a more expressive fragment of STIT such that its satisﬁability problem is PSPACE-complete and such that adding
knowledge will not increase the complexity of its satisﬁability problem. However, we want to emphasize that the STIT
fragment studied in Section 3 already has an interesting expressivity. Indeed, as we have shown in Section 4, it allows to
capture subtle aspects of counterfactual reasoning about agents’ choices.
We have presented in Section 7 a decidable dynamic extension of the logic dfKSTIT called dfKSTIT+ and we have shown
how it can be used in order to capture interesting aspects of dialogue between an artiﬁcial agent and a human user. We
also postpone to future research an analysis of the complexity of this logic.
An analysis of intensity of counterfactual emotions was also beyond the objectives of the present work. However, we in-
tend to investigate this issue in the future in order to complement our qualitative analysis of affective phenomena with
a quantitative analysis. Moreover, we have focused in this paper on the logical characterization of four counterfactual
emotions: regret, rejoicing, disappointment and elation. We intend to extend our analysis in the future by studying the
counterfactual dimension of “moral” emotions such as guilt and shame. Indeed, as several psychologists have shown (see,
e.g., [36]), guilt involves the conviction of having injured someone or of having violated some norm or imperative, and the
belief that this could have been avoided.
Appendix A. Annex
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
Let ϕ be a formula of LSTIT .
• If card(AGT) 2: ϕ is STIT-satisﬁable iff ϕ is NCL-satisﬁable;
• If card(AGT) 3: if ϕ is STIT-satisﬁable then ϕ is NCL-satisﬁable. (The converse is false: there exists ϕ such that ϕ is
NCL-satisﬁable and ¬ϕ is STIT-valid.)
Proof. Let us prove that a STIT-model is a NCL-model. For notational convenience, we write J instead of AGT \ J . Let
M = (W , {R J } J⊆AGT , V ) be STIT -model and let us prove that it is an NCL model. It suﬃces to prove that the constraints on
a NCL model are true in M. By the constraint 2 of Deﬁnition 1, we have R J1∪ J2 =
⋂
j∈ J1∪ J2 R{ j} =
⋂
j∈ J1 R{ j} ∩
⋂
j∈ J2 R{ j} =
R J1 ∩ R J2 . So we have R J1∪ J2 ⊆ R J1 ∩ R J2 . Now let us prove R∅ ⊆ R J ◦ RAGT\ J . If wR∅v , then the constraint 3 of Deﬁnition 1
gives:
⋂
j∈ J R{ j}(w) ∩
⋂
j∈ J R{ j}(v) 
= ∅. That is to say: R J (w) ∩ R J (v) 
= ∅. So wR J ◦ R J v .
Now given that a STIT-model is a NCL-model, for all cardinalities of AGT , we have the implication “ϕ is STIT-satisﬁable
implies ϕ is NCL-satisﬁable”.
If card(AGT) = 1, we have that if ϕ is STIT -satisﬁable then ϕ is NCL-satisﬁable. Indeed, both the logic STIT and NCL are
just the logic S5 for the operator [∅] because the operator [1] is trivial (as we have [1]ϕ ↔ ϕ).
If card(AGT) = 2, from [29] we have that STIT is exactly the logic S52 with operators [1] and [2]. (We do not care about
operators [{1,2}] and [∅] because we have the two validities [{1,2}]ϕ ↔ ϕ and [∅]ϕ ↔ [1][2]ϕ .) Concerning NCL, directly
from the axiomatics of NCL, we have that NCL is exactly [S5, S5] with operators [1] and [2]. As S52 = [S5, S5] [24], we
have that STIT and NCL have the same satisﬁable formulas.
If card(AGT) 3, the problem of satisﬁability of NCL is in NEXPTIME (see [5] or [54]) whereas the problem of satisﬁability
of STIT is undecidable (see [29]). So the two logics do not have the same satisﬁable formulas.
To sum up, we have:
• If card(AGT) = 1, STIT, S5 and NCL are the same logic;
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• If card(AGT) 3, we have:
◦ STIT and S5card(AGT) are the same logic;
◦ If a formula is STIT-satisﬁable then it is NCL-satisﬁable. However, there exists a NCL-satisﬁable formula which is not
STIT-satisﬁable. 
A.2. Proof of Lemma 1
Let M = (W , R, V ) be a NCL-model. Let r be a positive integer. Let w1, . . . ,wr ∈ W be such that for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , r},
wiR∅w j . Let J1, . . . , Jr ⊆ AGT be such that i 
= j implies J i ∩ J j = ∅. We have:⋂
i=1...r
R J i (wi) 
= ∅.
Proof. For r = 0 the lemma is true by convention. Let us prove the lemma by recurrence on r ∈ N∗ . Let us call P(r) the
statement of the lemma.
• P(1) is true.
• Let us prove P(2) because we need it in order to prove P(r + 1) from P(r).
Let u and w be in W such that uR∅w . Let J , K ⊆ AGT be two coalitions such that J ∩ K = ∅. As uR∅w , we have
uR J ◦ R J w . And then uR J ◦ RK w . This proves P(2).• Now, assume that P(r) is true for a ﬁxed r ∈ N∗ and let us prove that P(r + 1) is true. Let w1, . . . ,wr,wr+1 ∈ W be
such that for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , r}, wi R∅w j . Let J1, . . . , Jr, Jr+1 ⊆ AGT be such that i 
= j implies J i ∩ J j = ∅. As P (r) is
assumed, we can apply it on (w1, . . . ,wr) and ( J1, . . . , Jr) and obtain
⋂
i=1,...,r R J i (wi) 
= ∅. Let us consider a world
w such that w ∈⋂i=1,...,r R J i (wi). Now consider R⋃i=1,...,r J i (w) and R Jr+1 (wr+1). By applying P (2) on (w,wr+1), and
(
⋃
i=1,...,r J i, Jr+1), we obtain that R⋃i=1,...,r J i (w) ∩ R Jr+1 (wr+1) is not empty, i.e. R⋃i=1,...,r J i (w) ∩ R Jr+1 (wr+1) contains
a point v . Note that by constraint 1 of Deﬁnition 3 we have R⋃
i=1,...,r J i (w) ⊆
⋂
i=1,...,r R J i (w). As
⋂
i=1,...,r R J i (w) ⊆⋂
i=1,...,r R J i (wi), we have a point v in
⋂
i=1,...,r+1 R Ji (wi). In other words, P(r + 1) is true.
Conclusion: We have proved by recurrence that for all r  1, P(r) is true. 
A.3. Proof of Theorem 2
Let ϕ ∈ LdfSTIT . Then, the following three propositions are equivalent:
1. ϕ is NCL-satisﬁable;
2. ϕ is STIT-satisﬁable;
3. ϕ is STIT-satisﬁable in a polynomial sized product STIT-model.
Proof. As “2. implies 1.” has been investigated in Proposition 1, we focus here on the proof of “1. implies 3.” and we use a
selection-of-points argument as in [35]. Let ϕ be a NCL-satisﬁable formula: there exists a NCL-model M = (W , V ) and z0
such that M, z0 | ϕ . The proof is divided in two parts. We ﬁrst construct from M a product STIT-model M′ = (W ′, V ′).
Secondly we ensure that there exists a point (Z0, . . . , Z0) ∈ W ′ such that M′, (Z0, . . . , Z0) | ϕ . Broadly speaking, we take
care in the construction to create a new point in M′ for each subformula 〈∅〉ψ of ϕ true in M. We also take care to
construct enough points so that all subformulas 〈∅〉ψ and [ J ]χ of ϕ false at z0 of M can also be false in M′ .
Notations.
• Elements of W are noted x, y, etc. Elements of W ′ are noted x, x0, y, etc. x j stands for the j-th coordinate of x. Given
an element x, we note x J = (x j) j∈ J ;
• (P , . . . , P ) denotes the vector x where for all j ∈ AGT , x j = P . Given a coalition J , (P , . . . , P ) J denotes x J where for all
j ∈ J , x j = P ;
• SF(ϕ) denotes the set of all subformulas of ϕ . SF1(ϕ) is the set of all subformulas of ϕ which are not in the scope of
a modal operator and which are of the form [ J ]χ where χ is propositional. For instance, if ϕ = [1]p ∧ 〈∅〉[2]q, then
SF(ϕ) = {p,q, [1]p, [2]q, 〈∅〉[2]q,ϕ} whereas SF1(ϕ) = {[1]p}.
Part 1: we deﬁne the model M′ . The deﬁnition of M′ relies on the following two sets of formulas:
• Pos = {ψ | 〈∅〉ψ ∈ SF(ϕ) and M, z0 | 〈∅〉ψ} ∪ {Z0} where Z0 =∧{[ J ]χ |[ J ]χ∈SF1(ϕ) and M,z0|[ J ]χ}[ J ]χ . Formulas in Pos
are called positive formulas.
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| 〈∅〉ψ} ∪ Neg_in_z0 where Neg_in_z0 = {[ J ]χ | [ J ]χ ∈ SF1(ϕ) and
M, z0 
| [ J ]χ}. Formulas in Neg are called negative formulas.
Example 7. Suppose that ϕ = 〈∅〉([1]χ1 ∧ [{1,3}]χ2) ∧ ¬〈∅〉([2]χ3 ∧ [4]χ4) ∧ [5]χ5 ∧ [6]χ6 ∧ ¬[7]χ7 ∧ ¬[8]χ8 and that M,
z0 | ϕ .
Then we have:
• Z0 = [5]χ5 ∧ [6]χ6;
• Pos= {[1]χ1 ∧ [{1,3}]χ2, [5]χ5 ∧ [6]χ6};
• Neg_in_z0 = {[7]χ7, [8]χ8};
• Neg = {[2]χ3, [4]χ4, [7]χ7, [8]χ8}.
First we deﬁne the Cartesian product W ′ = Cn = C×C×· · ·×C where C = Pos∪{0, . . . , card(Neg) − 1}. Then we introduce
few notations and prove the following Lemma 2 that allows us to deﬁne V ′:
• For all x ∈ W ′ , for all P ∈ Pos, we consider the set:
Coordx=P = { j ∈ AGT | x j = P }.




∣∣ P ∈ Pos, [ J ]χ ∈ SF(P ), J ⊆ Coordx=P};
Intuitively Posx denotes a set of boolean formulas that must be true in x because of positive formulas. Formulas are
boolean because of the syntactic restriction over the language (deﬁnition of dfSTIT). For instance let us consider the
positive formula P = [1]p∧ [{2,3}]q. The model M′ will be designed so that the point (P , . . . , P ) is the world where P
must be true. Indeed, for all α2, . . . ,αn ∈ C , the set Pos(P ,α2,...,αn) contains p. In the same way, for all α1,α4, . . . ,αn ∈ C ,





Intuitively Boxesx is the conjunction of all (boolean) formulas which have to be true in x because of positive formulas.
• We ﬁx a bijection i : {0, . . . , card(Neg) − 1} → Neg.
We need such a bijection between integers in {0, . . . , card(Neg) − 1} and Neg in order to use arithmetic operations +
and mod (modulo) for deﬁning V ′ .




x j mod card(Neg)
)
where mod is the operation of modulo. Intuitively, i(x) will correspond to the negative formula [ J ]χ which will be false
at x if there are no contradictions with Boxesx .
Lemma 2. For all x ∈ W ′ , there exists y ∈ W such that M, y | Boxesx.
Proof. We just recall that by deﬁnition of Pos, we have that for all P ∈ Pos, M, z0 | 〈∅〉P . So for all P ∈ Pos, there exists a
point yP ∈ W , such that M, yP | P .
Let x ∈ W ′ . In the proof, we ﬁrst deﬁne y ∈ W . Secondly we prove that M, y | Boxesx .
1. First, we deﬁne the candidate y ∈ W of our Lemma 2. As M is an NCL-model, M satisﬁes the assumption of indepen-
dence of agents (Lemma 1). We are simply going to apply Lemma 1 where points are {yP | P ∈ Pos} and sets of agents





As this set is not empty, let us consider y in it. Let y ∈⋂P∈Pos RCoordx=P (yP ).
6 Indeed, for all P , Q ∈ Pos, Coordx=P ∩ Coordx=Q 
= ∅, implies that there exists j ∈ Coordx=P ∩ Coordx=Q . By deﬁnition of Coordx=P , we have x j = P . In the
same way, by deﬁnition of Coordx=P , we have x j = Q . Hence P = Q .
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2. We have deﬁned y ∈ W . Now let us prove that M, y | Boxesx . In other words, we are going to prove that for all
χ ∈ Posx , M, y | χ .
Let χ ∈ Posx . By deﬁnition of Posx , there exists P ∈ Pos and [ J ]χ ∈ SF(P ) such that J ⊆ Coordx=P . Recall that M, yP | P
and, consequently, we have M, yP | [ J ]χ . By deﬁnition of y, we have yP RCoordx=P y. But as J ⊆ Coord
x=P , we have
RCoordx=P
⊆ R J . So, we have yP R J y and, consequently, we have M, y | χ . So we have M, y | Boxesx . 
Finally, we deﬁne V ′ = f ◦ V where f is a mapping from W ′ to W deﬁned by:
• f (Z0, . . . , Z0) = z0;
• For all x ∈ W ′ such that x 
= (Z0, . . . , Z0), i(x) is of the form [ J ]χ ∈ Neg.
– If there exists y ∈ W such that M, y | ¬χ ∧ Boxesx then f (x) def= y.
– Else, we choose a world y in W such that M, y | Boxesx (such a world exists because of Lemma 2) and we deﬁne
f (x) def= y.
Clearly, M′ = (W ′, V ′) is a product STIT-model and its size is polynomial. As V ′ = f ◦ V , we have immediately the
following lemma useful for the Part 2 of the proof.
Lemma 3. For all x ∈ W ′ , M′, x | Boxesx.
Proof. Let x ∈ W ′ . By deﬁnition of f , M, f (x) | Boxesx . But recall that V ′ = f ◦ V : in particular, we have V ′(x) = V ( f (x)).
Recall also that Boxesx is a boolean formula. So we obtain M, x | Boxesx . 
Part 2 of the proof : we prove M′, (Z0, . . . , Z0) | ϕ . We prove the following two facts:
Fact 1. For all 〈∅〉ψ of ϕ , we have M, z0 | 〈∅〉ψ iff M′, (Z0, . . . , Z0) | 〈∅〉ψ .
Fact 2. For all [ J ]χ ∈ SF1(ϕ), we have M, z0 | [ J ]χ iff M′, (Z0, . . . , Z0) | [ J ]χ .
⇒ of Fact 1 and ⇒ of Fact 2 In order to prove it, it suﬃces to prove that for all P ∈ Pos we have M′, (P , . . . P ) | P .
Let P ∈ Pos. P is a conjunction of formulas of the form [ J ]χ where χ is a Boolean formula. Let [ J ]χ ∈ SF(P ). We have
to show that for all x ∈ W ′ such that x J = (P , . . . , P ) J , we have M, x | χ . The situation is drawn in Fig. 7. But for those
x such that x J = (P , . . . , P ) J , we have J ⊆ Coordx=P . So χ ∈ Posx implies that | Boxesx → χ . But, by Lemma 3, we have
M′, x | Boxesx and this leads to M′, x | χ . Finally, M′, (P , . . . , P ) | [ J ]χ . Therefore we have M′, (P , . . . , P ) | P .
⇐ of Fact 1 Let N = [ J1]χ1 ∧ . . . [ Jk]χk be such that 〈∅〉N ∈ SF(ϕ) and M, z0 
| 〈∅〉N . Let us prove that for all x0 ∈ W ′ ,
M′, x0 | ¬N . We suggest the reader to look at Fig. 8 during this part.
Consider y0 = f (x0) ∈ W . By deﬁnition of f , we have M, y0 | Boxesx0 . We also have M, y0 | ¬N . So, there is i ∈{1, . . . ,k} such that M, y0 
| [ J i]χi . Notice that [ J i]χi belongs to Neg.
Now we are going to prove that M′, x0 
| [ J i]χi . We are going to deﬁne a vector x ∈ W ′ such that x0R ′J i x and M′, x |¬χi . As depicted in Fig. 8, we want that J i performs the same joint action both in x0 and in x.
The case where J i = AGT is trivial: we take x = x0. Else, let j0 be an arbitrary agent in J i and x ∈ W ′ be the candidate
vector such that:
• x Ji = x0 J i ;
• x j = 0 for all j ∈ J i \ { j0};
• x j0 = i−1([ J i]¬χi) −
∑
j∈AGT| j 
= j and x ∈{0,...,card(Neg)−1} x j mod N .0 j
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Now we check that M′, x | ¬χi . As M, y0 | 〈 J i〉¬χi , there exists y ∈ W such that yR Ji y0 and M, y | ¬χi . Notice
that M, y | Boxesx . Indeed, Boxesx only contains subformulas χ1 such that [K ]χ1 is a subformula of Pos where K ⊆ J i
(because only coordinates in J i of x are in Pos; the others are integer). Then we have | Boxes x0 → Boxesx . Hence M, y |
Boxesx . To sum up, we have M, y | Boxesx ∧¬χi . So, as i(x) = [ J i]¬χi , by deﬁnition of f we have that f (x) is a such point
y where M, y | Boxesx ∧ ¬χi . Finally, by deﬁnition of V ′ , we have M′, x | ¬χi .
⇐ of Fact 2 Let us prove now that M′, (Z0, . . . , Z0) | Neg_in_z0. More precisely we prove that for all [ J ]χ ∈ Neg_in_z0,
M′, (Z0, . . . , Z0) | 〈 J 〉¬χ . We know that M, z0 | 〈 J 〉¬χ . So there exists y ∈ W such that yR J z0 and M, y | ¬χ . The
case J = AGT is trivial. Let us consider j0 ∈ J and let us deﬁne the candidate vector x:
• x J = (Z0, . . . , Z0) J ;
• x j = 0 for all j ∈ J \ { j0};
• x j0 = i−1([ J ]χ).
Let us check that M′, x | ¬χ . Notice that Boxesx only contains Boolean formulas χ ′ where formulas [ J ′]χ ′ are subformulas
of Z0, where J ′ ⊆ J . Hence M, y | Boxesx . Furthermore, M, y | ¬χ . So by deﬁnition of f , as i(x) = [ J ]χ , we have that
f (x) is a point y such that M, y | ¬χ ∧ Boxesx . By deﬁnition of V ′ , M′, x | ¬χ .
The conclusion of the proof is left to the reader. 
A.4. Proof of Corollary 1
Deciding if a formula in LdfSTIT is STIT-satisﬁable is NP-complete.
Proof. SAT is reducible to the STIT-satisﬁability problem of a formula in LdfSTIT . Thus deciding if a formula in LdfSTIT is
STIT-satisﬁable is NP-hard.
Now let us see that it is in NP. According to Theorem 2, if a formula ϕ is STIT-satisﬁable, ϕ is satisﬁable in a polynomial-
sized STIT-model. So a non-deterministic algorithm to solve the satisﬁability problem can be as follows:
• we guess a polynomial-sized model M′ = (W ′, V ′) and a world x ∈ W ′;
• we check whether M′, x | ϕ holds or not.
Note that checking whether M′, x | ϕ or not can be done in polynomial time in the size of M′ and in the length of ϕ . As
the size of M′ is polynomial in the length of ϕ , checking whether M′, x | ϕ or not can be done in polynomial time in the
size of ϕ . 
A.5. Proof of Corollary 2
A formula ϕ in LdfSTIT is STIT-valid iff we have NCL ϕ .
Proof. We have:
• for all formulas ϕ ∈ L , |NCL ϕ iff NCL ϕ (Theorem 1);
• for all formulas ϕ ∈ LdfSTIT , |STIT ϕ iff |NCL ϕ (Theorem 2).
Hence: for all formulas ϕ ∈ LdfSTIT , |STIT ϕ iff NCL ϕ . 
A.6. Proof of Theorem 3
The satisﬁability problem of dfKSTIT is NP-complete if card(AGT) = 1 and PSPACE-complete if card(AGT) 2.
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(∃) choose β a set of at most n subsets of CL(Σ) such that there exists S ∈ β such that Σ ⊆ S , where n is the number of operators Ki
appearing in Σ .
Check Kiψ , ¬Kiψ , K jψ , Boolean coherence and STIT coherence:
1. for all S, S ′ ∈ β , Kiψ ∈ S iff Kiψ ∈ S ′;
2. for all S ∈ β , Kiψ ∈ S implies ψ ∈ S;
3. for all S ∈ β , ¬Kiψ ∈ S iff there exists S ′ ∈ β such that ¬ψ ∈ S ′;
4. for all S ∈ β , for all j 
= i, K jψ ∈ S implies ψ ∈ S;
5. ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∈ S iff (ψ1 ∈ S and ψ2 ∈ S);
6. ψ1 ∨ ψ2 ∈ S iff (ψ1 ∈ S or ψ2 ∈ S);
7. for all S ∈ β , ψ ∈ S xor ¬ψ ∈ S .
8. check that
∧
ψ∈S|ψ∈LSTIT ψ is STIT-satisﬁable.
(∀) choose S ′ ∈ β
(∀) choose j ∈ AGT \ {i}
if there exists a formula of the form ¬K jψ in S ′ ,
call sat({K jθ ∈ S ′} ∪ {¬K jθ ∈ S ′}, j)
endIf
endFunction
Fig. 9. An algorithm for the KSTIT-satisﬁability problem of a given set of dfKSTIT-formulas Σ .
Proof. card(AGT) = 1
Let us consider the case card(AGT) = 1. In this case there are only three operators: [∅], [1], and K1. Nevertheless, the op-
erator [1] can be removed because we force RAGT = idW in our models. As a K1 operator cannot appear after a [∅] operator,
we can prove by a selected points argument that if a dfKSTIT-formula is KSTIT-satisﬁable, then it is in a polynomial sized
model (in [35], it is done for S5).
card(AGT) 2
Let us consider the case card(AGT) 2. Recall that the satisﬁability problem of S5card(AGT) is PSPACE-hard [28]. But the
logic S5card(AGT) is embedded into dfKSTIT. So deciding if a dfKSTIT-formula ϕ is KSTIT-satisﬁable is also PSPACE-hard.
Now let us prove that the KSTIT-satisﬁability problem of a given dfKSTIT-formula is in PSPACE. As APTIME = PSPACE [15],
it is suﬃcient to prove that this problem is in APTIME. Fig. 9 shows an alternating procedure sat(Σ , i) where Σ is a set
of dfKSTIT-formulas and i ∈ AGT . For all i ∈ AGT , when each formula of Σ starts with Ki or ¬Ki , then the call sat(Σ, i)
succeeds if and only if the set of formulas Σ is KSTIT-satisﬁable, that is, the conjunction of all formulas ϕ ∈ Σ is sat-
isﬁable. Note that Φ is satisﬁable iff K1Φ is satisﬁable. Thus, in order to check if Φ is satisﬁable, we call sat({K1Φ}, 1).
For all formulas ϕ , we deﬁne the set CL(ϕ) = SF(ϕ) ∪ {¬ψ | ψ ∈ SF(ϕ)}. CL(ϕ) contains all the subformulas of ϕ and their
negations. For all sets of formulas Σ , we deﬁne CL(Σ) =⋃ϕ∈Σ CL(ϕ).
The procedure sat(Σ , i) is inspired by the algorithms of the satisﬁability problem for S5n given in [28] and in [6]. It
checks the satisﬁability of a set of formulas Σ where all formulas of Σ starts with Ki or ¬Ki by ﬁrst constructing an
Ei-equivalence class represented by the set of subsets of CL(Σ). A subset of CL(Σ) represents all formulas that are true in
a given world of the Ei-equivalence class.
We require one of the worlds to satisfy Σ , that is, we require that there exists S ∈ β such that Σ ⊆ S . We then check that
all constraints on agent i’s knowledge are satisﬁed: steps 1, 2 and 3 in the algorithm of Fig. 9. We also check that constraints
on other agents’ knowledge are satisﬁed in worlds of the Ei-equivalence class: step 4. We check Boolean constraints: steps
5, 6 and 7. We ﬁnally check that at each world of the Ei-equivalence class all LSTIT-subformulas supposed to be true are
together satisﬁable: step 8. This veriﬁcation can run non-deterministically in polynomial time thanks to Theorem 1.
Finally we continue the construction of the model: at every point S ′ of the Ei-equivalence class and for all agents j,
we check if all constraints due to all subformulas of the form K jθ and ¬K jθ can be together satisﬁable. Let l(Σ) be the
number of epistemic modal operators in the formulas of Σ that have the maximal number of epistemic modal operators.
Note that l({K jθ ∈ S ′} ∪ {¬K jθ ∈ S ′}) < l(Σ) so that the termination is granted. During all the recursive call of the algorithm
sat({K1Φ},1), we only work with subformulas of K1Φ . The algorithm runs in polynomial time. 
A.7. Proof of Theorem 4
Let ϕ be a formula of LdfKSTIT . We have equivalence between:
• ϕ is satisﬁable in KNCL;
• ϕ is satisﬁable in KSTIT.
Proof. Unfortunately, the general results about completeness of fusion of logics given in [24] cannot be applied here because
we are dealing with syntactic fragments.
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⇑ We can prove that a KSTIT-model is a KNCL-model. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1.
⇓ Let Φ be a formula of LdfKSTIT satisﬁable in a KNCL-model, i.e. suppose that there exists a KNCL-model M =
(W , {R J } J⊆AGT , {Ei}i∈AGT , V ) and w ∈ W such that M, w | Φ . We are going to deﬁne a KSTIT-model M′ from M satisfy-
ing Φ . In order to do this, we are simply going to replace each “NCL-model” in the model M by an equivalent STIT-model
given by Theorem 2 as shown in Fig. 10.
Consider the set:
S = {s ∈ W | there exists a ﬁnite sequence i1, . . . in ∈ AGT such that wEi1 ◦ · · · ◦ Ein s}
where ◦ is the standard composition operation over binary relation.
Let STIT-SF(Φ) be the set of all subformulas of Φ that do not contain an epistemic operator Ki .









We have M, s | ψs . As Φ is in the fragment dfKSTIT, we have that ψs is in the fragment dfSTIT. So we can apply the
Theorem 2: it gives the existence of a STIT-model Ms = (Ws, {Rs J } J⊆AGT , Vs) and rs ∈ Ws such that Ms, rs | ψs .
Now we deﬁne M′ = (W ′, {R ′J } J⊆AGT , {E ′i}i∈AGT , V ′) as follows:
• W ′ = {(s, t) | s ∈ S, t ∈ Ws};
• R ′J = {〈(s, t), (s, t′)〉 ∈ W ′ × W ′ | (t, t′) ∈ Rs J };
• E ′i = {〈(s, rs), (s′, rs′ )〉 | (s, s′) ∈ Ei} ∪ {〈(s, t), (s, t)〉 | (s, t) ∈ W ′};• V ′(s, t) = Vs(t).
Now we can prove by induction that for all subformulas ϕ of Φ , we have that for all s ∈ S , M, s | ϕ iff M′, (s, rs) | ϕ .
(dfSTIT) If ϕ is a see-to-it formula or is of the form 〈∅〉ψ where ψ is a see-to-it-formula, then ϕ does not contain
any epistemic operator. Hence by deﬁnition of ψs we have that ψs contains either ϕ or ¬ϕ . So, by deﬁnition
of the STIT-model Ms , we have M, s | ϕ iff Ms, rs | ϕ . And Ms, rs | ϕ is equivalent to M′, (s, rs) | ϕ
by deﬁnition of R ′J and V ′ .
(boolean cases) Boolean cases are left to the reader.
(Kiϕ) Let us consider a subformula of the form Kiϕ . We have M, s | Kiϕ iff for all s′ ∈ W such that sEi s′ we
have M, s′ | ϕ . By deﬁnition of S , this is equivalent to: for all s′ ∈ S such that sEi s′ we have M, s′ | ϕ .
By induction, this is equivalent to the fact that for all s′ ∈ S such that sEi s′ we have M′, (s′, rs′ ) | ϕ . By
deﬁnition of E ′i this is equivalent to M′, (s, rs) | Kiϕ . 
A.8. Proof of Validity (22) in Section 7.1
|KSTIT KB∗ → Kt REJOICEu passu.
Proof. We give a syntactic proof of the previous validity. We show that we have
KNCL KB∗ → Kt REJOICEu passu
by applying the axioms and rules of inference of KNCL. Then,
|KSTIT KB∗ → KtREJOICEu passu
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1. KNCL ¬[∅]([u]¬studiedu → [u]¬passu) → 〈∅〉([u]¬studiedu ∧ ¬[u]¬passu)
2. KNCL 〈∅〉([u]¬studiedu ∧ ¬[u]¬passu) → 〈∅〉([u]¬studiedu ∧ 〈u〉passu)
3. KNCL 〈∅〉([u]¬studiedu ∧ 〈u〉passu) → 〈∅〉([u][u]¬studiedu ∧ 〈u〉passu) by the standard S5 validity [ J ]χ ↔ [ J ][ J ]χ
4. KNCL 〈∅〉([u][u]¬studiedu ∧ 〈u〉passu) → 〈∅〉〈u〉([u]¬studiedu ∧ passu) by necessitation rule for [∅] and the standard va-
lidity ([ J ]χ1 ∧ 〈 J 〉χ2) → 〈 J 〉(χ1 ∧ χ2)
5. KNCL 〈 J 〉ϕ → (〈 J 〉ϕ ∧ 〈∅〉ϕ) by the NCL Axiom Mon
6. KNCL 〈 J 〉ϕ → 〈∅〉ϕ by 5
7. KNCL 〈∅〉〈u〉([u]¬studiedu ∧ passu) → 〈∅〉〈∅〉([u]¬studiedu ∧ passu) by 6, necessitation rule for [∅] and the standard va-
lidity ([∅]χ1 ∧ 〈∅〉χ2) → 〈∅〉(χ1 ∧ χ2)
8. KNCL 〈∅〉〈∅〉([u]¬studiedu ∧ passu) → 〈∅〉([u]¬studiedu ∧ passu) by the standard S5 validity 〈∅〉χ ↔ 〈∅〉〈∅〉χ
9. KNCL 〈∅〉([u]¬studiedu ∧ passu) → ¬[∅]([u]¬studiedu → ¬passu)
10. KNCL ¬[∅]([u]¬studiedu → [u]¬passu) → ¬[∅]([u]¬studiedu → ¬passu) from 1–4 and 7–9
11. KNCL [∅]([u]¬studiedu → ¬passu) → [∅]([u]¬studiedu → [u]¬passu) from 10
12. KNCL (〈∅〉[u]¬studiedu ∧ [∅]([u]¬studiedu → [u]¬passu)) → 〈∅〉[u]¬passu by the standard validity
([∅]χ1 ∧ 〈∅〉χ2) → 〈∅〉(χ1 ∧χ2)
13. KNCL (〈∅〉[u]¬studiedu ∧ [∅]([u]¬studiedu → ¬passu)) → 〈∅〉[u]¬passu from 11, 12
14. KNCL Ku(〈∅〉[u]¬studiedu ∧[∅]([u]¬studiedu → ¬passu)) → Ku〈∅〉[u]¬passu by 13, Axiom K and necessitation rule for Ku
15. KNCL 〈∅〉[u]¬passu → 〈AGT \ {u}〉〈u〉[u]¬passu by the NCL Axiom Elim(∅)
16. KNCL 〈u〉[u]¬passu → [u]¬passu by Axiom 5 for [ J ]
17. KNCL [u]¬passu → ¬passu by Axiom T for [u]
18. KNCL 〈u〉[u]¬passu → ¬passu from 16, 17
19. KNCL 〈AGT \ {u}〉〈u〉[u]¬passu → 〈AGT \ {u}〉¬passu by 18, necessitation rule for [ J ] and the standard validity
([ J ]χ1 ∧ 〈 J 〉χ2) → 〈 J 〉(χ1 ∧χ2)
20. KNCL 〈∅〉[u]¬passu → 〈AGT \ {u}〉¬passu from 15, 19
21. KNCL Ku〈∅〉[u]¬passu → Ku〈AGT \ {u}〉¬passu by 20, Axiom K and necessitation rule for Ku
22. KNCL Ku(〈∅〉[u]¬studiedu ∧ [∅]([u]¬studiedu → ¬passu)) → Ku〈AGT \ {u}〉¬passu from 14, 21
23. KNCL KtKu(〈∅〉[u]¬studiedu ∧ [∅]([u]¬studiedu → ¬passu)) → KtKu〈AGT \ {u}〉¬passu by 22, Axiom K and necessitation
rule for Kt
24. KNCL (KtKu〈∅〉[u]¬studiedu∧KtKu[∅]([u]¬studiedu → ¬passu)) → KtKu〈AGT \{u}〉¬passu by 23, and the standard validity
Ki(χ1 ∧χ2) ↔ (Kiχ1 ∧ Kiχ2)
25. KNCL (KtDESu¬passu ∧KtKupassu ∧KtKu〈∅〉[u]¬studiedu ∧KtKu[∅]([u]¬studiedu → ¬passu)) → REJOICEupassu from 24,
deﬁnition of REJOICEi χ and the standard validity (Kiχ1 ∧ · · · ∧ Kiχn) ↔ Ki(χ1 ∧ · · · ∧χn)
26. KNCL KB∗ → REJOICEupassu from 25 and
KB∗ = KtDESupassu ∧ KtKupassu ∧ KtKu〈∅〉[u]¬studiedu ∧ KtKu[∅]([u]¬studiedu → ¬passu) 
A.9. Proof of Proposition 2






[‖θ‖](ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) ↔ ([‖θ‖]ϕ1 ∧ [‖θ‖]ϕ2)
(Red[ J ])
[‖θ‖][ J ]ϕ ↔ [ J ][‖θ‖]ϕ
(RedKi )
[‖θ‖]Kiϕ ↔ ((θ → Ki(θ → [‖θ‖]ϕ))∧ (¬θ → Ki(¬θ → [‖θ‖]ϕ)))
Proof. We here just prove the validity of reduction axioms Red[ J ] and RedKi . The proofs of the other reduction axioms go
as in PAL [67].
M,w | [‖θ‖]Kiϕ ,
IFF (if M,w | θ then M,w | [‖θ‖]Kiϕ) and (if M,w | ¬θ then M,w | [‖θ‖]Kiϕ),
IFF (if M,w | θ then M‖θ‖,w | Kiϕ) and (if M,w | ¬θ then M‖θ‖,w | Kiϕ),
IFF (if M,w | θ then for all v ∈ W such that wE‖θ‖i v , M‖θ‖, v | ϕ) and (if M,w | ¬θ then for all v ∈ W such that
wE‖θ‖i v , M
‖θ‖, v | ϕ),
IFF (if M,w | θ then for all v ∈ W such that wE‖θ‖i v , M, v | [‖θ‖]ϕ) and (if M,w | ¬θ then for all v ∈ W such that
wE‖θ‖v , M, v | [‖θ‖]ϕ),i
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such that wEi v and M, v | ¬θ , M, v | [‖θ‖]ϕ),
IFF (if M,w | θ then M,w | Ki(θ → [‖θ‖]ϕ)) and (if M,w | ¬θ then M,w | Ki(¬θ → [‖θ‖]ϕ)),
IFF M,w | (θ → Ki(θ → [‖θ‖]ϕ)) ∧ (¬θ → Ki(¬θ → [‖θ‖]ϕ)).
M,w | [‖θ‖][ J ]ϕ ,
IFF M‖θ‖,w | [ J ]ϕ ,
IFF for all v ∈ W such that wR‖θ‖J v , M‖θ‖, v | ϕ ,
IFF for all v ∈ W such that wR J v , M, v | [‖θ‖]ϕ ,
IFF M,w | [ J ][‖θ‖]ϕ . 
A.10. Proof of Proposition 4
Let ϕ ∈ LdfKSTIT+ . Then, red(ϕ) ∈ LdfKSTIT .
Proof. Proposition 4 is proved by induction on the structure of ϕ . For the atomic case, we have red(p) ∈ LdfKSTIT . Then we
have to prove the following ﬁve inductive cases.
1. Suppose: if ϕ1 ∈ LdfKSTIT+ then red(ϕ1) ∈ LdfKSTIT . It follows that: if ¬ϕ1 ∈ LdfKSTIT+ then red(¬ϕ1) ∈ LdfKSTIT ,
2. Suppose: if ϕ1 ∈ LdfKSTIT+ then red(ϕ1) ∈ LdfKSTIT , and if ϕ2 ∈ LdfKSTIT+ then red(ϕ2) ∈ LdfKSTIT . It follows that: if
ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∈ LdfKSTIT+ then red(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) ∈ LdfKSTIT ,
3. Suppose: if ϕ1 ∈ LdfKSTIT+ then red(ϕ1) ∈ LdfKSTIT . It follows that: if [ J ]ϕ1 ∈ LdfKSTIT+ then red([ J ]ϕ1) ∈ LdfKSTIT .
4. Suppose: if ϕ1 ∈ LdfKSTIT+ then red(ϕ1) ∈ LdfKSTIT . It follows that: if Kiϕ1 ∈ LdfKSTIT+ then red(Kiϕ1) ∈ LdfKSTIT .
5. Suppose: if ϕ1 ∈ LdfKSTIT+ then red(ϕ1) ∈ LdfKSTIT , and if θ ∈ LdfKSTIT+ then red(θ) ∈ LdfKSTIT . It follows that: if[‖θ‖]ϕ1 ∈ LdfKSTIT+ then red([‖θ‖]ϕ1) ∈ LdfKSTIT .
Let us consider the case of negation (case 1). Suppose ¬ϕ1 ∈ LdfKSTIT+ . Therefore, ϕ1 ∈ LdfKSTIT+ and, by induction hy-
pothesis, we have red(ϕ1) ∈ LdfKSTIT . By deﬁnition of LdfKSTIT , it follows that ¬red(ϕ1) ∈ LdfKSTIT . The latter implies
red(¬ϕ1) ∈ LdfKSTIT , as ¬red(ϕ1) = red(¬ϕ1). We leave the case of conjunction (case 2) and of STIT operators [ J ] (case 3)
to the reader.
Let us consider the case of epistemic operators (case 4). Suppose Kiϕ1 ∈ LdfKSTIT+ . Therefore, ϕ1 ∈ LdfKSTIT+ and, by
induction hypothesis, we have red(ϕ1) ∈ LdfKSTIT . By deﬁnition of LdfKSTIT , it follows that Ki red(ϕ1) ∈ LdfKSTIT . The latter
implies red(Kiϕ1) ∈ LdfKSTIT , as Ki red(ϕ1) = red(Kiϕ1).
In order to prove the case of dynamic operators (case 5), we need the following Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. If ϕ ∈ LdfKSTIT and red(θ) ∈ LdfKSTIT then red([‖θ‖]ϕ) ∈ LdfKSTIT .
Proof. We prove Lemma 4 by induction on the structure of ϕ . For the atomic case, we have red([‖θ‖]p) ∈ LdfKSTIT . The
cases of atomic propositions, negation, conjunction and STIT operators are just straightforward. Let us prove the case of
epistemic operators, that is, when ϕ = Kiϕ1.
Suppose red(θ) ∈ LdfKSTIT and Kiϕ1 ∈ LdfKSTIT . Therefore, by deﬁnition of LdfKSTIT , we have ϕ1 ∈ LdfKSTIT and, by induc-




red(θ) → red([‖θ‖]ϕ1)))∧ (¬red(θ) → Ki(¬red(θ) → red([‖θ‖]ϕ1))) ∈ LdfKSTIT.
By deﬁnition of red, we have that
red
([‖θ‖]Kiϕ1)= (red(θ) → Ki(red(θ) → red([‖θ‖]ϕ1)))∧ (¬red(θ) → Ki(¬red(θ) → red([‖θ‖]ϕ1))).
Thus, we can conclude that red([‖θ‖]Kiϕ1) ∈ LdfKSTIT .
This concludes the proof of Lemma 4. 
Let us go back to the proof of Proposition 4. Suppose [‖θ‖]ϕ1 ∈ LdfKSTIT+ . Therefore, we have θ ∈ LdfKSTIT+ and ϕ ∈
LdfKSTIT+ and, by induction hypothesis, we have red(θ) ∈ LdfKSTIT and red(ϕ1) ∈ LdfKSTIT . From the latter, by Lemma 4, it
follows that red([‖θ‖]red(ϕ1)) ∈ LdfKSTIT . It is a routine task to check that red([‖θ‖]red(ϕ1)) = red([‖θ‖]ϕ1). Therefore, we
conclude that red([‖θ‖]ϕ1) ∈ LdfKSTIT . 
A.11. Proof of Corollary 4
The validities of dfKSTIT+ are completely axiomatized by the axioms and inference rules of dfKSTIT provided in Corol-
lary 3 together with reduction axioms of Proposition 2 and the rule of replacement of proved equivalents.
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validity. The completeness proof proceeds as follows. Suppose that ϕ ∈ LdfKSTIT+ and that ϕ is KSTIT+-valid. Then red(ϕ)
is KSTIT+-valid due to Proposition 3. Moreover, due to Proposition 4 we have red(ϕ) ∈ LdfKSTIT and, due to the fact that
KSTIT+ is a conservative extension of KSTIT, we have that red(ϕ) is KSTIT-valid. By the completeness of dfKSTIT (Corol-
lary 3), red(ϕ) is also provable there. dfKSTIT+ being a conservative extension of dfKSTIT, red(ϕ) is provable in dfKSTIT+ ,
too. As the reduction axioms and the rule of replacement of proved equivalents are part of our axiomatics, the formula ϕ is
also be provable in dfKSTIT+ . 






Proof. First of all, note that 〈〈say(t,passu)〉〉REJOICEupassu is logically equivalent to Pre(say(t,passu))∧Ktpassu ∧[‖Ktpassu‖]
REJOICEupassu . Thus, we just need to show that KB∗∗∗ implies the latter.
By deﬁnition of KB∗∗∗ , we have that:
A. |KSTIT+ KB∗∗∗ → Kt passu .
Let us prove that KB∗∗∗ implies [‖Ktpassu‖]REJOICEupassu . By deﬁnition of KB∗∗∗ and Axiom T for Kt we have that:
B. |KSTIT+ KB∗∗∗ → (Ktpassu ∧ DESupassu ∧ Ku[∅]([u]¬studiedu → ¬passu) ∧ Ku〈∅〉[u]¬studiedu).
From step 22 in the proof of Validity (22) (see Section A.8 in this appendix), we also have:
C. |KSTIT+ (Ku[∅]([u]¬studiedu → ¬passu) ∧ Ku〈∅〉[u]¬studiedu) → Ku〈AGT \ {u}〉¬passu .
Therefore, from the previous validities B and C, we have:
D. |KSTIT+ KB∗∗∗ → (Ktpassu ∧ DESupassu ∧ Ku〈AGT \ {u}〉¬passu).
Now, we are going to prove the following validity:
E. |KSTIT+ (Ktpassu ∧ DESupassu ∧ Ku〈AGT \ {u}〉¬passu) → [‖Ktpassu‖](Kupassu ∧ DESupassu ∧ Ku〈AGT \ {u}〉¬passu).
As [‖θ‖](ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn) is equivalent to [‖θ‖]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ [‖θ‖]ϕn (by reduction axiom Red∧), in order to prove the previous
validity E it is suﬃcient to prove that the following three formulas are valid:
• Ktpassu → [‖Kt passu‖]Ku passu
• DESupassu → [‖Kt passu‖]DESupassu
• Ku〈AGT \ {u}〉¬passu → [‖Ktpassu‖]Ku〈AGT \ {u}〉¬passu .
We just give the proof of the ﬁrst validity, leaving the proofs of the other two validities to the reader.
1. |KSTIT+ [‖Ktpassu‖]Kupassu ↔ ((Ktpassu → Ku(Ktpassu → [‖Ktpassu‖]passu)) ∧ (¬Ktpassu → Ku(¬Ktpassu → [‖Ktpassu‖]
passu))) by the reduction axiom RedKi
2. |KSTIT+ ((Ktpassu → Ku(Ktpassu → [‖Ktpassu‖]passu)) ∧ (¬Ktpassu → Ku(¬Ktpassu → [‖Ktpassu‖]passu))) ↔ ((Ktpassu →
Ku(Ktpassu → passu)) ∧ (¬Ktpassu → Ku(¬Ktpassu → passu))) by the reduction axiom Redp and the rule of replacement
of proved equivalence
3. |KSTIT+ ((Ktpassu → Ku(Ktpassu → passu)) ∧ (¬Ktpassu → Ku(¬Ktpassu → passu))) ↔ ((Ktpassu → Ku) ∧ (¬Ktpassu →
Ku(¬Ktpassu → passu))) by Axiom T for Kt
4. |KSTIT+ ((Ktpassu → Ku) ∧ (¬Ktpassu → Ku(¬Ktpassu → passu))) ↔ (¬Ktpassu → Ku(¬Ktpassu → passu)) by the stan-
dard validity of normal modal logic Kt ↔ 
5. |KSTIT+ Ktpassu → (¬Ktpassu → Ku(¬Ktpassu → passu))
6. |KSTIT+ Ktpassu → [‖Ktpassu‖]Kupassu from 1–4 and 5.
Therefore, by the previous validities D and E, we have:
F. |KSTIT+ KB∗∗∗ → [‖Ktpassu‖](Kupassu ∧ DESupassu ∧ Ku〈AGT \ {u}〉¬passu).
846 E. Lorini, F. Schwarzentruber / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 175 (2011) 814–847As REJOICEupassu abbreviates Kupassu ∧ DESupassu ∧ Ku〈AGT \ {u}〉¬passu , from the previous validity F, we have:
G. |KSTIT+ KB∗∗∗ → [‖Ktpassu‖]REJOICEupassu .
As Pre(say(t,passu)) = Kt[say(t,passu)]REJOICEupassu ∧ Kt¬REJOICEupassu , in order to conclude the proof, we just need
to prove that we have:
H. |KSTIT+ KB∗∗∗ → (Kt[say(t,passu)]REJOICEupassu ∧ Kt¬REJOICEupassu).
By the deﬁnition of REJOICEupassu , it is straightforward to verify that KB∗∗∗ implies Kt¬REJOICEupassu . Let us prove
that KB∗∗∗ implies Kt[say(t,passu)]REJOICEupassu .
1. |KSTIT+ KB∗∗∗ → KtKB∗∗∗ by Axiom 4 and Axiom 5 for Kt
2. |KSTIT+ Kt(KB∗∗∗ → [‖Ktpassu‖]REJOICEupassu) by the previous validity G and necessitation rule for Kt
3. |KSTIT+ KB∗∗∗ → Kt[‖Ktpassu‖]REJOICEupassu by 1, 2 and Axiom K for Kt
4. |KSTIT+ KB∗∗∗ → Kt[say(t,passu)]REJOICEupassu by 3, the validity [‖θ‖]ϕ → [!θ]ϕ , Axiom K and necessitation rule
for Kt . 
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